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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a situation in which Betty Buyer purchases a computer printer 
from Suzie Seller. The first time Betty attempts to print something, the 
printer bursts into flames. By selling Betty a defective printer, Suzie has 
breached the warranty of redhibition, which warrants that the thing sold is 
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free from hidden defects.1 And yet, as a result of this redhibitory defect, 
Suzie also may have breached the warranty of fitness for ordinary use, an 
entirely separate warranty that guarantees the thing sold is reasonably fit 
for its ordinary use.2 The court that addresses Betty’s claim must 
characterize it as either a claim for breach of the warranty of redhibition 
or a claim for breach of the warranty of fitness.3 The classification of 
Betty’s claim bears capital importance because the rules governing the two 
warranties differ substantially in terms of remedies and time constraints 
on the buyer’s action.4 For instance, if the warranty of fitness governs 
Betty’s claim, she will be subjected to a ten-year prescriptive period5 and 
entitled to contractual damages, assuming Suzie had no knowledge of the 
defect.6 Alternatively, if redhibition governs Betty’s claim, it will be 
subjected to a shorter redhibitory prescriptive period of either one or four 
years,7 and her remedy will be limited to rescission of the sale.8 
Although it would seem that two distinct warranties governed by 
wholly different rules would apply to separate and non-overlapping 
circumstances, recent judicial pronouncements show that courts have 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2018, by SARA DANIEL. 
 1. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520 (2018) (providing the warranty against 
redhibitory defects). Here, the printer suffers from a redhibitory defect that causes 
it to catch on fire. 
 2. See id. art. 2524 (providing the warranty of fitness). The ordinary use of 
a printer is to print. Thus, if the printer catches on fire while printing, it is not fit 
for its ordinary use. 
 3. See generally id. arts. 2520, 2524. 
 4. See, e.g., id. arts. 2520–22, 2524, 2530–32, 2534, 2537–38, 2540–41, 
2545, 2548. 
 5. See id. arts. 2524, 3499 (providing that a personal action is subject to a 
liberative prescription of ten years unless otherwise provided by legislation). 
 6. See id. art. 2524 (providing that the general rules of conventional 
obligations govern a buyer’s rights against a seller for breach of warranty of 
fitness); see also id. art. 1994 (providing that an obligor is liable for damages 
caused by his failure to perform a conventional obligation, which may consist of 
nonperformance, defective performance, or delayed performance). 
 7. See id. art. 2534 (providing that the action for redhibition against a good 
faith seller prescribes in four years from the date of delivery or one year from the 
day the defect was discovered, whichever occurs first, and that the action for 
redhibition against a bad faith seller prescribes one year from the day the defect 
was discovered). 
 8. See id. art. 2520 (providing that a buyer has the right to rescission of a 
sale or to a reduction in the price depending on the nature and extent of the defect). 
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struggled to determine where one warranty ends and the other begins.9 
According to one court that found the warranties of fitness and redhibition 
to be mutually exclusive, “[The warranty of fitness] applies to a situation 
in which the cause of action is based, not on the defective nature of the 
thing at issue, but on its fitness for ordinary use . . . .”10 Another court, 
however, held exactly the opposite: “[W]e find no reason to deem the two 
articles exclusive.”11 Indeed, these attempts at distinction—or lack 
thereof—are contradictory and fail to elucidate the circumstances under 
which each warranty applies.12 The courts’ confusion is understandable, 
however, because the legislative distinction between the two warranties is 
largely artificial, and any separation is unnecessarily trivial.13 
The differences in remedies, prescriptive periods, and overall legal 
frameworks of the two warranties14 may also suggest a legislative 
determination that, as a matter of policy, the breach of the warranty of 
fitness is more egregious than the breach of the warranty of redhibition. 
Further, because the legislature recently added the warranty of fitness,15 it 
seems that perhaps this addition was the result of the legislature’s 
deliberate recognition of the law’s previous failure to adequately address 
fitness issues under the legal framework for redhibition. Surprisingly, 
neither of these logical inferences is correct.16 Indeed, the warranty of 
                                                                                                             
 9. See, e.g., Mouton v. Generac Power Sys., Inc., 152 So. 3d 985 (La. Ct. 
App. 2014); Sw. La. Hosp. Ass’n v. BASF Const. Chems., LLC, 947 F. Supp. 2d 
661 (W.D. La. 2013); Hollybrook Cottonseed Processing, LLC v. Carver, Inc., 
No. 09-0750, 2010 WL 892869 (W.D. La. Mar. 11, 2010); Cunard Line Co. v. 
Datrex, Inc., 926 So. 2d 109 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
 10. Cunard Line Co., 926 So. 2d at 114. See also Stroderd v. Yamaha Motor 
Corp., U.S.A., No. 04-3040, 2005 WL 2037419, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2005) 
(“[A] breach of contract of fitness for ordinary use claim is only an independent 
cause of action when an item is free from redhibitory defects.”). 
 11. Justiss Oil Co., Inc. v. T3 Energy Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-01745, 2011 
WL 539135, at *6 (W.D. La. Feb. 7, 2011). The court expressly invited the 
Louisiana Supreme Court to provide clarification on the issue: “Without 
Louisiana Supreme Court clarification on this issue, we are not reluctant to side 
with the overwhelming majority of Louisiana appellate courts.” Id. at *5. See also 
Sw. La. Hosp. Ass’n, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 690.  
 12. See, e.g., Sw. La. Hosp. Ass’n, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 690; Cunard Line Co., 
926 So. 2d at 114. 
 13. See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
 14. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1994, 2520, 2524, 2534, 3499 (2018); 
see also discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
 15. See generally id. art. 2524 (eff. Jan. 1, 1995). 
 16. See discussion infra Part I.D. 
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fitness—a common law creation—was never recognized as a stand-alone 
warranty in Louisiana prior to 1995.17 
By adopting the warranty of fitness as a stand-alone sales warranty, 
the legislature created an artificial distinction between the warranties of 
fitness and redhibition that Louisiana courts have been unable to 
rationalize.18 If defects are redhibitory,19 the goods will be unfit for 
ordinary use by default.20 Accordingly, the warranty of fitness for ordinary 
use has no independent meaning in Louisiana law of sales.21 Courts have 
reached different conclusions as to whether a buyer who alleges that a 
product has a redhibitory defect can also argue that the defect renders the 
product unfit for its ordinary use.22 Because courts differ on this point, 
similarly situated parties throughout the state remain subject to different 
rights and obligations.23 
The time has come for Louisiana to rectify its mistakes of the past and 
undo what never should have been done. This Comment revisits a problem 
that was identified over a quarter-century ago24 and calls for the repeal of 
the warranty of fitness for ordinary use as a separate warranty in 
Louisiana.25 Part I provides an overview and brief history of the warranty 
of fitness. It surveys the legislative and jurisprudential history of the 
warranties of fitness and redhibition prior to 1995, analyzing Louisiana 
jurisprudence and introducing the correlation between the warranties. Part 
                                                                                                             
 17. See discussion infra Part I.D. 
 18. See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
 19. A redhibitory defect is one that “renders the thing useless, or its use so 
inconvenient that it must be presumed that a buyer would not have bought the 
thing had he known of the defect” or else “without rendering the thing totally 
useless, it diminishes its usefulness or its value so that it must be presumed that a 
buyer would still have bought it but for a lesser price.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520. 
The warranty of redhibition only covers defects that exist at the time of delivery. 
See id. art. 2530. If a defect is apparent, it is not a redhibitory defect. Id. art. 2521. 
 20. See generally George L. Bilbe, Redhibition and Implied Warranties Under 
the 1993 Revision of the Louisiana Law of Sales, 54 LA. L. REV. 125 (1993). 
 21. See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
 22. See, e.g., Cassidy v. Ford Motor Co., No. 15-2483, 2016 WL 687621, at 
*4 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2016); 425 Notre Dame, LLC v. Kolbe & Kolbe Mill Work 
Co., No. 15-454, 2016 WL 1110232, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 22, 2016); Sw. La. 
Hosp. Ass’n v. BASC Constr. Chems., LLC, 947 F. Supp. 2d 661 (W.D. La. 
2013); Justiss Oil Co. v. T3 Energy Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-01745, 2011 WL 
539135, at *5 (W.D. La. Feb. 7, 2011); Cunard Line Co. v. Datrex, Inc., 926 So. 
2d 109 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
 23. See supra note 22. 
 24. See discussion infra Part I.E. 
 25. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2018). 
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I also assesses the impetus for codifying the warranty of fitness in 
Louisiana. Part II of this Comment delineates the confusion the 1995 
codification of the warranty of fitness created, including the warranty’s 
lack of independent meaning and the uncertain scope of its application. 
Part III proposes the repeal of the impractical and confusing warranty of 
fitness for ordinary use and demonstrates that any purpose the article 
sought to serve is better addressed through the warranties of redhibition 
and fitness for particular use. This Comment concludes by demonstrating 
that the repeal of the warranty of fitness for ordinary use is vital for the 
preservation of redhibition, as well as for the development of the warranty 
of fitness for particular use. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LOUISIANA SALES WARRANTIES: FROM ROMAN 
LAW TO THE CURRENT CONFUSION 
Louisiana law imposes various warranty26 obligations on sellers that 
are implied by the operation of law regardless of whether they are 
expressed in a sales agreement.27 In Louisiana, all sales, whether of 
movable or immovable property, are made with two implied warranties 
relating to quality.28 First, the seller warrants that the thing sold is free 
from redhibitory vices or defects that would render it useless or would 
significantly diminish its value.29 Second, the seller warrants that the thing 
sold is reasonably fit for both its ordinary use and, under certain 
circumstances, the particular use contemplated by the buyer.30 Although 
current law articulates the seller’s obligations in fitness and redhibition as 
distinct warranties subject to separate legal frameworks, this distinction 
                                                                                                             
 26. A “warranty” is an assurance that a seller makes regarding the goods or 
services being sold. Robert P. Thibeaux et al., Implied Warranties and Waivers 
(LA), PRAC. L. COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS (Aug. 2, 2017), https://us.practical 
law.thomsonreuters.com/w-002-2088. 
 27. Id. The statutory warranties are suppletive, so parties are generally free to 
limit or exclude one or more warranties within the limitations public policy dictates. 
DIAN TOOLEY-KOBLETT & DAVID GRUNING, SALES § 10:14, in 24 LOUISIANA CIVIL 
LAW TREATISE (Aug. 2017 update) (“Admittedly, the warranties appear to overlap, 
and in practice it is sometimes difficult to determine which warranty is applicable 
to a particular case. Understandably, courts have sometimes had difficulty 
identifying the relevant warranty.”). 
 28. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2524. The seller also warrants the buyer against 
eviction, which protects the buyer from “loss of, or danger of losing, the whole or part 
of the thing sold because of a third person’s right that existed at the time of the sale.” 
Id. art. 2500. But such warranty is outside the scope of this Comment. 
 29. Id. art. 2520. 
 30. Id. art. 2524. 
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has not always existed.31 Whereas Louisiana has recognized the warranty 
of redhibition since the promulgation of its first Civil Code in 1808,32 the 
warranty of fitness is a new creation, codified as recently as 1995.33 A 
complete understanding of the relationship between these warranties 
therefore requires an exploration of their historical and jurisprudential 
roots. 
A. Louisiana Sales Warranties: In General 
The warranty of redhibition protects a buyer against hidden defects in 
the thing sold that diminish its value or usefulness.34 The Louisiana Civil 
Code recognizes two types of redhibitory defects: one that renders the 
thing useless or its use so inconvenient that it must be presumed that a 
buyer would not have bought the thing had he known of the defect; and 
one that, without rendering the thing totally useless, diminishes its 
usefulness or value so that it must be presumed that a buyer would have 
bought the thing at a lesser price.35 The former category of redhibitory 
defect entitles the buyer to a rescission of the sale,36 whereas the latter 
limits the buyer’s recovery to a reduction of the price.37 In the hypothetical 
described in the Introduction, the printer suffered from a redhibitory 
defect—namely, combustibility—that rendered its use so inconvenient 
that Betty presumably would not have bought the printer had she known 
of the defect.38 Accordingly, Betty would be entitled to rescission of the 
sale.39 Assume, however, that the printer does not catch on fire but instead 
prints gray lines across the page. This problem still constitutes a 
redhibitory defect but one that, instead of rendering the printer completely 
useless, diminishes its value such that a court would presume that Betty 
would have paid a lesser price.40 Assuming the gray-line problem could be 
                                                                                                             
 31. H.B. 106, 1993 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 841 (1993). 
 32. See discussion infra Parts I.B.1–2. 
 33. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (1995). See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
 34. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520 (2018). See generally TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & 
GRUNING, supra note 27. 
 35. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520. 
 36. Id. art. 2497 (providing that when the buyer has the right to recede from 
the contract, the seller must return the price and reimburse the buyer for expenses 
of the sale).  
 37. Id. art. 2524. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 27, § 11:2. 
 38. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. 
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fixed, Betty would be entitled to a reduction of the sales price in the 
amount required to remedy the defect.41 
If Betty’s claim is in redhibition, she must prove that the defect existed 
at the time of delivery, that it was not apparent, and that it should not have 
been discovered by a reasonably prudent buyer.42 Assuming Suzie did not 
know of the defect at the time of the sale, Betty must give Suzie notice and 
an opportunity to repair the defect.43 If Suzie cannot or will not correct it, 
Betty is entitled to the return of the purchase price and reimbursement of 
incidental expenses.44 Betty’s claim in redhibition prescribes either four 
years from the delivery of the printer or one year from the date she 
discovered the defect, whichever occurs first.45 
In addition to redhibition, Betty has a second avenue for recovery—
breach of the warranty of fitness.46 The Louisiana Civil Code provides for 
two types of warranties of fitness: fitness for ordinary use and fitness for 
particular use.47 Fitness for ordinary use warrants that the thing sold is 
                                                                                                             
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. arts. 2521, 2530; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2521 cmt. c (2018) (“Under 
this Article the standard of diligence that must be exercised by the buyer in 
determining whether the thing purchased is defective is that of a prudent 
administrator.”); id. art. 2521 cmt. d (“Under this Article the buyer must make 
more than a casual observation of the object; he must examine the thing to 
ascertain its soundness.”). See also discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
 43. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2522. 
 44. Id. art. 2531. Incidental expenses include “reasonable expenses occasioned 
by the sale, as well as those incurred for the preservation of the thing, less the credit 
to which the seller is entitled if the use made of the thing, or the fruits it has yielded, 
were of some value to the buyer.” Id. Alternatively, a bad faith seller—one who 
knows that the thing sold has a defect but fails to declare it or makes a false 
declaration regarding the quality of the thing—is liable to the buyer for the return 
of the purchase price with interest from the time it was paid, reimbursement of 
reasonable expenses occasioned by the sale and incurred for the preservation of the 
thing, and for damages and reasonable attorney fees. Id. art. 2545. 
 45. Id. art. 2534. The action for redhibition against a seller who knew, or is 
presumed to have known, of the existence of a defect in the thing sold prescribes 
one year from the day the buyer discovered the defect. Id.; see LA. CIV. CODE 
ANN. art. 2534 cmt. b (“[A]n action in redhibition prescribes ten years from the 
time of perfection of the contract regardless of whether the seller was in good or 
bad faith.”); id. cmt. c (“The purpose of a longer prescriptive period is to 
discourage precipitate action by disappointed buyers, to facilitate the settlement 
of disputes between buyers and sellers, and to make the prescriptive period 
consistent with the one prevailing in other jurisdictions.”). 
 46. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524. 
 47. Id. 
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reasonably fit for its ordinary use.48 Fitness for particular use warrants that 
the thing is fit for the buyer’s particular use if and only if the seller has 
reason to know the buyer’s particular or intended use and that the buyer is 
relying on the seller’s skill or judgment in selecting the thing.49 Plainly, a 
printer that catches fire is unfit for its ordinary use of printing.50 Suppose, 
however, that the printer only caught fire when performing large-scale print 
jobs and that Betty told Suzie she wanted a printer that could print large 
documents. Under these circumstances, the printer would likely remain fit 
for ordinary use because it still prints documents, but nonetheless would be 
unfit for Betty’s particular purpose.51 In either case, the general rules of 
conventional obligations would govern Betty’s claim for breach of the 
warranty of fitness.52 
If Betty succeeded in her claim for breach of the warranty of fitness, 
she could obtain dissolution of the sale as well as contractual damages for 
Suzie’s noncompliance with the warranty.53 Betty need not give Suzie the 
opportunity to repair the defect regardless of whether she had knowledge 
of the defect.54 Significantly, a claim for breach of the warranty of fitness 
is subject to the ten-year prescriptive period applicable to conventional 
obligations.55 
                                                                                                             
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. (“When the seller has reason to know the particular use the buyer 
intends for the thing, or the buyer’s particular purpose for buying the thing, and 
that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment in selecting it, the thing 
sold must be fit for the buyer’s intended use or for his particular purpose.”). 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. Id. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
 53. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (providing that the buyer’s rights for a seller’s 
breach of the warranty of fitness are governed by the rules of conventional 
obligations); see generally id. arts. 1994, 1995, 2013. Contractual damages are 
comprised of losses sustained and profits deprived. Id. art. 1995. 
 54. Id. art. 2524. A good faith obligor is only liable for the damages that were 
foreseeable at the time the contract was made. Id. art. 1996. A bad faith obligor is 
liable for all damages, foreseeable or not, that are a direct consequence of his 
failure to perform. Id. art. 1997. See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1997 cmt. b 
(2018) (“An obligor is in bad faith if he intentionally and maliciously fails to 
perform his obligation.”); id. cmt. c (“A truly fraudulent failure to perform of 
course, would constitute bad faith under this Article.”). 
 55. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3499. The prescriptive period begins to run the 
moment the cause of action arises—namely, the date of the obligor’s failure to 
perform. Hawthorne Land Co. v. Occidental Chem. Corp., 431 F.3d 221, 228 (5th 
Cir. 2005). 
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B. Legislative and Jurisprudential History: Before the Codified 
Confusion 
Although Louisiana currently recognizes two warranties of quality, 
this was not always the case.56 The Louisiana Civil Code has long 
encompassed the civilian institution of redhibition.57 The common law 
warranty of fitness, however, emerged in Louisiana and grew through the 
case law, codified only in 1995.58 Understanding the complicated 
relationship between the two warranties,59 therefore, requires a thorough 
examination of Louisiana’s espousal of each. 
1. Redhibition: A Civilian Institution 
 The civil law historically has acknowledged and sought to remedy the 
problem of latent defects in goods by restoring parties to the positions they 
would have occupied had the defect not caused the failed performance.60 
The action of redhibition originated in Rome as a system of implied 
warranty against latent defects and remained largely intact as it permeated 
Louisiana law by way of France.61 Over time, Louisiana has added its own 
nuances to redhibition, but much of the Roman law endures.62 
Beginning in Rome around the 1st century B.C., the curule aediles63 
forced individuals who sold slaves to stipulate expressly that the slaves 
                                                                                                             
 56. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (eff. Jan. 1, 1995). 
 57. See discussion infra Part I.B.1. 
 58. See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
 59. See discussion infra Part II.A. 
 60. Young v. Ford Motor Co., 595 So. 2d 1123, 1128 (La. 1992). See, e.g., 
LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520 (1870); id. art. 2496 (1825); id. art. 66 (1808); CODE 
NAPOLEON art. 1641 (1804); JUSTINIAN’S DIGEST 21.1.1, § 6. 
 61. Leonard Oppenheim, The Law of Slaves—A Comparative Study of the 
Roman and Louisiana Systems, 14 TUL. L. REV. 384, 399 (1940). See generally 
Shael Herman, The Contribution of Roman Law to the Jurisprudence of 
Antebellum Louisiana, 56 LA. L. REV. 257, 264–65 (1995). 
 62. Christopher K. Odinet, Commerce, Commonality, and Contract Law: 
Legal Reform in a Mixed Jurisdiction, 75 LA. L. REV. 741, 760 (2015). These 
minor updates were necessary to modernize and provide more even-handedness 
and predictability in the law. Id. 
 63. The curule aediles was the officer in charge of regulating markets and 
solving conflicts between buyers and sellers. Elizabeth A. Spurgeon, All For One 
or Every Man for Himself? What is Left of Solidarity in Redhibition, 70 LA. L. 
REV. 1227, 1230 (2010). 
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were free from defects.64 If the seller’s statements were untrue, the buyer 
could bring an action in redhibition within six months to rescind the sale 
and receive a return of the purchase price.65 Thus, Roman law remedied 
complaints of latent defects by returning the parties to their positions 
before the sale—a restoration of the status quo.66 These rules were later 
incorporated into Justinian’s Digest67 and broadened to cover all 
movables.68 When the defect was apparent, the rules of redhibition did not 
apply.69 The seriousness of the defect dictated whether the buyer was 
entitled to rescission of the sale—actio redhibitoria—or monetary 
compensation for the difference between the sale price and the value of 
the defective item—quanti minoris.70 
As the Roman law of obligations infiltrated France, redhibition 
developed and obtained a significant presence in French law.71 The Code 
Napoléon provided: 
The seller is bound to warranty in respect of secret defects in the 
thing sold which render it improper for the use to which it was 
destined, or which so far diminish such use, that the buyer would 
not have purchased it, or would not have given so large a price, if 
he had known them.72 
                                                                                                             
 64. Daniel E. Murray, Implied Warranty Against Latent Defects: A Historical 
Comparative Law Study, 21 LA. L. REV. 586, 595 (1960). During this period, the 
rules for slaves were extended to animals, but it is unclear whether they were 
extended to movables. Id. Subsequently, express warranties were no longer 
mandated, but the curule aediles required the seller to announce that the slave did 
not have certain defects. Id. 
 65. Spurgeon, supra note 63, at 1231. A seller’s ignorance of the defect was 
not a valid defense. Murray, supra note 64. 
 66. Bruce V. Schewe & Debra J. Hale, Review of Recent Developments: 
1991–1992, 53 LA. L. REV. 917, 919 (1993). 
 67. On Emperor Justinian’s order, Justinian’s Digest was compiled from 530 
to 533 A.D. as part of the Corpus Juris Civilis, a compilation of the writings of the 
classical jurists. See generally Stephen Utz, Book Review, 11 CONN. J. INT’L L. 395 
(1996) (reviewing DAVID PUGSLEY, JUSTINIAN’S DIGEST AND THE COMPILERS 
(1995)). Specifically, the Digest was a compilation of dozens of classical jurists’ 
writings and was designed to be a comprehensive text of Roman law. Id. 
 68. Murray, supra note 64. 
 69. JUSTINIAN’S DIGEST 21.1.1, § 6. 
 70. Spurgeon, supra note 63, at 1231. 
 71. Id. 
 72. CODE NAPOLÉON art. 1641 (1804). 
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As was the case under Roman law, the seller was not accountable for 
apparent defects.73 The buyer could return the thing and obtain restitution 
of the price or, alternatively, keep the thing and receive “such a portion of 
the price . . . as shall be settled by competent persons.”74 If the seller knew 
of the defect, he was bound to pay damages and return the purchase price 
along with any expenses occasioned by the sale, but if he did not have 
knowledge, he was bound only to pay restitution of the purchase price and 
reimburse expenses occasioned by the sale.75 
Influenced by its Roman and French predecessors, redhibition in early 
Louisiana law protected slave and animal buyers, among others, against 
latent defects that were non-apparent76 and unknown to the buyer at the 
time of the sale.77 Like its antecedents, the Code of 1808 distinguished 
between the seller’s liability for defects that were known and unknown to 
him.78 It required the defect to have existed at the time of the sale, although 
                                                                                                             
 73. Id. art. 1642. 
 74. Id. art. 1644. 
 75. Id. art. 1646. Under early French law, there was no bright-line 
prescriptive period attached to a redhibition claim; rather, the action had to be 
brought “within a short interval, according to the nature of such faults, and the 
usage of the place where the sale was made.” Id. art. 1648. 
 76. The seller was not accountable for the apparent defects or vices that the 
buyer could have seen himself, “as, for instance, if a horse has his eyes put out.” Id. 
art. 69. “The buyer cannot complain of a defect of which he is ignorant only through 
his own fault, any more than of those that the seller may have declared to him.” Id. 
 77. The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808 provided: “The seller is bound to 
declare to the buyer the defects of the thing sold, as far as they are known to him, 
and if he does not do it, the sale shall be cancelled or the price shall be diminished 
according to the kind of defects.” LA. CIV. CODE art. 66 (1808). The Code defined 
redhibition as “the cancelling of the sale on account of some defect in the thing 
sold, such as may be sufficient to oblige the seller to take it back again and have 
the sale annulled.” Id. art. 65. It defined redhibitory defects and those that render 
the thing absolutely unfit for the purpose for which it was intended in commerce, 
diminishing its utility or rendering it so inconvenient that it is presumable that if 
these defects had been known to the buyer, he would not have bought at all or 
would have bought at a reduced price. Id. art. 67. 
 78. “Although the defects of the thing sold were unknown to the seller, he 
will nevertheless be responsible, if these defects are of a hidden nature, and the 
seller may, in this case, have the sale cancelled or have the price lessened . . . .” 
Id. art. 68. “If the seller was acquainted with the defects of the thing, he is liable 
to all damages toward the buyer, besides the restitution of the price he may have 
received.” Id. art. 71. “If the seller was ignorant of the defects of the thing, he 
shall only be obliged to the restitution of the price and to make reimbursement to 
the buyer of the costs occasioned by the sale.” Id. art. 72. 
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a defect that appeared immediately after or within three days following the 
sale was presumed to have existed at the time of the sale.79 
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1825 amended the definition of redhibition 
to encompass “the avoidance of a sale on account of some vice or defect in 
the thing sold, which renders it either absolutely useless, or its use so 
inconvenient and imperfect, that it must be supposed that the buyer would 
not have purchased it, had he known of the vice.”80 Apart from minor 
changes in semantics and a lengthening of the prescriptive period,81 the 
Code of 1825 preserved the law of redhibition as it previously existed.82 
Likewise, the Code of 1870 retained the characteristics of the Code of 
1825.83 The traditional law of redhibition thus remains largely intact today, 
enduring as a civilian institution embedded deeply in Louisiana law.84 
2. The Warranty of Fitness: A Jurisprudential Embracement 
In contrast to the state’s long history with the warranty of redhibition, 
Louisiana’s relationship with the warranty of fitness is limited.85 The 
legislature did not adopt the warranty until 1995, but the notion of “fitness” 
was not foreign to Louisiana law prior to that time.86 Indeed, Louisiana 
courts formerly recognized “fitness” as a component of redhibition,87 
                                                                                                             
 79. Id. art. 76. The buyer could initiate the action within six months from the 
date of the sale or from the time the defect was discovered, provided that more 
than one year had not elapsed since the sale. Id. art. 75. 
 80. Id. art. 2496 (1825). 
 81. When the seller did not know of the vice, the redhibitory action had to be 
commenced within a year of the date of the sale. Id. art. 2512. When the seller knew 
of the vice and failed to declare it, the action could be commenced at any time, 
provided that a year had not elapsed since the discovery of the vice. Id. art. 2524. 
 82. As in the Code of 1808, neither apparent defects nor defects that the seller 
declared to the buyer prior to the sale constituted redhibitory defects. Id. arts. 
2497–98. Likewise, the defect must have existed before the sale. Id. art. 2508. A 
good faith seller was bound to restore the price and to reimburse the expenses 
occasioned by the sale and incurred for the preservation of the thing, but a bad 
faith seller was answerable in damages. Id. arts. 2509, 2523. 
 83. See generally id. arts. 2520–47 (1870). 
 84. See generally supra note 4.  
 85. Id. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (eff. Jan 1, 1995). 
 86. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. a (2018) (noting that, although the 
article is new, it does not change the law because the Louisiana jurisprudence has 
recognized the existence of the obligation). 
 87. See, e.g., Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 
Inc., 262 So. 2d 377 (La. 1972); Falk v. Luke Motor Co., 112 So. 2d 683 (La. 
1959); Radalec Inc. v. Automatic Firing Corp., 81 So. 2d 830 (La. 1955); Jackson 
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suggesting an inherent endorsement of fitness long before its eventual 
enactment. 
The warranty of fitness first appeared in Louisiana jurisprudence in 
the 1900 case of Fee v. Sentell, in which the Louisiana Supreme Court 
stated, “We are only announcing a principle which no one denies when we 
state that the vendor, unless warranty is waived, warrants the thing sold as 
fit for the particular purpose for which it was bought.”88 Fee involved the 
sale of sugarhouse machinery, which the buyer alleged was not what the 
vendor guaranteed because it was in imperfect condition, broken, and unfit 
for use.89 Recognizing that secondhand machines cannot do the work of 
new ones, the court stated that a secondhand machine must nonetheless be 
“fit to do the work the contract intended.”90 In so stating, the court did not 
attempt to distinguish fitness from redhibition91 but, rather, appeared to 
utilize different terminology to refer to the same concept.92 
Louisiana courts subsequently alluded to the existence of a warranty 
of fitness without distinguishing it from the warranty of redhibition.93 For 
example, in Falk v. Luke Motor Co., the Louisiana Supreme Court held 
that an automobile that will not run, or that runs intermittently and requires 
the frequent attention of a mechanic, is “manifestly not fit or acceptable 
for the purposes intended” and granted relief under the law of 
redhibition.94 
Courts also continually referred to products as “unfit” for use because 
of latent defects, effectively analyzing fitness as a component of 
                                                                                                             
v. Breard Motor Co., 120 So. 478 (La. 1929); Crawford v. Abbott Auto. Co., 101 
So. 871, 872 (La. 1924). 
 88. Fee v. Sentell, 28 So. 279, 282 (La. 1900). 
 89. Id. at 280. 
 90. Id. at 282. 
 91. Id. at 279 (noting that a vendee is not entitled to an action quantum 
minoris for defects discoverable on mere inspection). 
 92. Id. at 282–83 (“The buyer, in our judgment, is without the right to a 
diminution of the price for any defect discoverable upon simple inspection.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 93. LA. STATE L. INST., REVISION OF THE LAW OF SALES: WARRANTY OF 
FITNESS, No. 8-1-89, at 3 (Nov. 17–18, 1989) (prepared for Meeting of the 
Council by Saul Litvinoff, Reporter). See also supra note 87. 
 94. Falk v. Luke Motor Co., 112 So. 2d 683, 686 (“[H]aving purchased this 
car to meet specific needs and a desirable increase in the volume of his business, 
its defects, imperfections, and successive mechanical failures requiring almost 
constant replacements, changes and repairs became a malignant and oppressive 
burden, the relief from which is to be found in the redhibitory action.”). 
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redhibition.95 In Media Production Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of 
North America, Inc., for example, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed 
an appellate court’s ruling that denied warranty rights to the purchaser of 
an imported Mercedes-Benz against the American distributor of 
Mercedes-Benz that supplied the automobile to the dealer.96 Immediately 
after the purchase, the buyer found the automobile “unsuitable for use,” 
alleging a number of defects.97 In holding that the buyer could recover 
from the defendant, the Court stated, “We see no reason why the 
[consumer-protection] rule should not apply to the pecuniary loss resulting 
from the purchase of a new automobile that proves unfit for use because 
of latent defects.”98 The Court evidently viewed fitness as a component of, 
or a way of establishing, redhibition rather than as a stand-alone 
warranty.99 Likewise, in Young v. Ford Motor Co., the Louisiana Supreme 
Court referred again to fitness as a way of establishing the existence of a 
defect, stating, “A buyer of an automobile who asserts a redhibition claim 
need not show the particular cause of the defects making the vehicle unfit 
for the intended purposes, but rather must simply prove the actual 
existence of such defects.”100 By acknowledging that the combination of 
vices rendering the car unfit for use resulted in a claim of redhibition, the 
Court treated the warranty of fitness as indistinguishable from the 
warranty against redhibitory defects.101 
Before the codification of the warranty of fitness, even when courts 
seemingly identified it as independent and distinct from the warranty 
against redhibitory defects,102 the distinction was inconsequential because 
Louisiana courts recognized no remedies beyond those under 
redhibition.103 Even if the court referred to the warranties of redhibition 
and fitness independently, the same legal framework governed each.104 
                                                                                                             
 95. See, e.g., Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 
Inc., 262 So. 2d 377, 381 (La. 1972). 
 96. Id. at 377. 
 97. Id. at 380. The defects included: a peeling off of the interior trim; failure 
of the interior lights to burn; transmission problems; stalling in traffic; a defective 
air conditioner; excessive brake squeal; deterioration of rear window channels; 
uncorrectable vibration; and paint deficiencies. Id. 
 98. Id. at 381. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Young v. Ford Motor Co., 595 So. 2d 1123, 1126 (La. 1992). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See infra text accompanying notes 226–30. 
 103. See, e.g., Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974); Hob’s Refrigeration 
& Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Poche, 304 So. 2d 326, 328 (La. 1974). 
 104. See, e.g., Young, 595 So. 2d at 1126; Rey, 298 So. 2d at 840; Hob’s 
Refrigeration, 304 So. 2d at 328; Media Prod. Consultants, 262 So. 2d at 377. 
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Until the revision of the law of sales in 1995, courts conceived fitness as 
comprising part of the warranty against redhibition.105 The failure of a 
thing to be fit for use constituted a breach of the warranty of redhibition; 
proof that the thing was unfit for use was proof of a defect’s existence; and 
breach of fitness resulted in the seller’s liability under redhibition.106 
Although courts did not refer to the warranty of “particular use” by 
name prior to the Sales Revision, a solution existed if a seller delivered a 
thing that was not defective but otherwise did not meet a buyer’s 
expectations: the law of conventional obligations.107 Some cases referred 
to a warranty of fitness for “intended” use,108 but like ordinary fitness, the 
courts considered it merely an element of redhibition.109 Although it may 
seem unusual for courts to fashion new terminology—namely, fitness—
                                                                                                             
Indeed, in the 1961 decision of Crowley Grain Drier, Inc. v. Fontenot, a Louisiana 
appellate court stated that “unlike damages for other contractual breaches, 
damages caused by a breach of the warranty in a contract of sale are regarded as 
founded upon redhibition and subject instead to the cited codal prescription . . . 
applicable to redhibitory actions.” 132 So. 2d 573, 577 (La. Ct. App. 1961). 
 105. See cases cited supra note 104. 
 106. See cases cited supra note 104. Redhibitory remedies included either 
reduction of the price or rescission and, in the case of the seller’s knowledge of 
the offending defect, damages and attorney fees. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2531, 
2545 (2018). 
 107. See, e.g., Victory Oil, Co. v. Perret 183 So. 2d 360, 364 (La. Ct. App. 
1966) (“The defendants . . . have injected the false issue of redhibition . . . in an 
attempt to bring the action within a one year prescriptive period. We hold that the 
real issue raised by the petition in reconvention is one of damages arising out of 
an alleged breach of contract.”); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2529 cmt. a 
(2018) (providing that the article, although new, does not change the law); id. art. 
2529 cmt. f (“When a product is contracted for and a product other than what was 
agreed upon is supplied, such a situation gives rise to an action for breach of 
contract . . . .”). 
 108. See, e.g., Media Prod. Consultants, 262 So. 2d at 380 (“Two warranty 
obligations are inherent in every sale, the warranty of merchantable title and the 
warranty of reasonable fitness for the product’s intended use.”) (emphasis added); 
Falk v. Luke Motor Co., 112 So. 2d 683, 686 (La. 1959) (“[A] car which will not 
run or which runs intermittently requiring the frequent attention of a mechanic to 
keep it going is an abomination and is manifestly not fit or acceptable for the 
purposes intended.”) (emphasis added); Jackson v. Breard Motor Co., 120 So. 478, 
479 (La. 1929) (“It cannot be denied that an automobile which is not in running 
condition is not fit for the purpose intended.”) (emphasis added); Crawford v. 
Abbott Auto. Co., 101 So. 871, 872 (La. 1924) (“It is not incumbent upon the buyer 
to seek out, allege, and prove the particular and underlying cause of the defects 
which make the thing sold unfit for the purpose intended . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 109. See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
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for an already existing framework, the term had roots in the common law 
with which the courts undoubtedly were familiar.110 
C. Common Law Warranties of Fitness and Merchantability: A Possible 
Explanation for Article 2524 
Although the civil law historically sought to protect buyers from 
defective goods through redhibition,111 the English doctrine of caveat 
emptor112 long prevailed in the common law, affording limited protection 
to buyers.113 Until the 19th century, English courts suggested that a seller 
could not be held liable for selling an item of substandard quality unless 
he had knowledge of such quality.114 It was not until the seminal decision 
of Gardiner v. Gray that the implied warranty of merchantability115 
appeared in the common law.116 In Gardiner, the buyer bought silk of 
“waste” grade from Gray but received silk of an even lower grade.117 For 
the first time, the court held that caveat emptor did not apply to a buyer 
who did not have an opportunity to inspect the goods.118 The question for 
                                                                                                             
 110. See discussion infra Part I.C. 
 111. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 112. The doctrine of caveat emptor declares that a purchaser is expected to 
make his own examination of products, and a vendor is generally not liable for 
any harm resulting to him or others resulting from defects existing at the time of 
the transfer. Coastline Terminals of Conn., Inc. v. USX Corp., 156 F. Supp. 2d 
203, 209 (D. Conn. 2001); see also State ex rel. Jones Store Co. v. Shain, 179 
S.W.2d 19, 20 (Mo. 1944) (Under the rule of caveat emptor, “the buyer takes the 
risk of quality and condition unless he protects himself by warranty, or there has 
been a false representation made fraudulently by the vendor”). 
 113. Young v. Ford Motor Co., 595 So. 2d 1123, 1128 (La. 1992). 
 114. 18 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 52:67 (4th ed. 2017). See, e.g., Parkinson 
v. Lee, 102 E.R. 389 (1802) (“[T]he law does not raise an implied warranty that the 
commodity should be merchantable; though a fair merchantable price were given; 
and therefore if there be a latent defect then existing in it, unknown to the seller, and 
without fraud on his part, such seller is not answerable, though the goods turned out 
to be unmerchantable.”) (internal parenthetical information omitted). 
 115. Although “merchantability” was not defined during the common-law era, 
courts spoke of merchantable goods as being “of a quality such as is generally 
sold in the market and suitable for the purpose for which they [were] intended, 
although not of the best quality.” Wallace v. L.D. Clark & Son, 174 P. 557, 558 
(Okla. 1918). 
 116. Don Brown, Sales—Breach of Implied Warranty, 23 TEX. L. REV. 200, 
200 (1945). See Gardiner v. Gray, 4 Camp. 144, 171 (K.B. 1815). 
 117. Gardiner, 4 Camp. at 171. 
 118. Id. (“Without any particular warranty, this is an implied term in every 
such contract . . . . He cannot without a warranty insist that it shall be of any 
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the court became whether the item purchased was of such a quality “as can 
be reasonably brought into the market to be sold as such waste silk . . . .”119 
In holding for the buyer, the court concluded that the silk was unfit for the 
purposes of waste silk and thus could not be sold for the requisite value.120 
Courts thereafter began to recognize that at least if the goods were 
purchased by description, a commercial seller of goods impliedly 
warranted them to be of merchantable quality.121 
The modern iteration of the English warranty of merchantability is 
codified in the Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”).122 Article 2 of the 
U.C.C., which governs the sale of goods in every state but Louisiana,123 
provides two different warranties of quality: the warranty of 
merchantability, which encompasses fitness for ordinary use; and the 
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose known to the seller.124 The 
implied warranties of merchantability and fitness operate to protect buyers 
                                                                                                             
particular quality or fitness, but the intention of both parties must be taken to be, 
that it shall be saleable in the market under the denomination mentioned in the 
contract between them.”). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Brown, supra note 116. See Gardiner, 4 Camp. 114. “[I]t was 
acknowledged in numerous early cases that a manufacturer impliedly warrants its 
goods to be merchantable, that is, that they are reasonably fit for the general 
purpose for which they were manufactured.” WILLISTON, supra note 114. 
 122. See U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. COMM’N 2018). The 
Uniform Sales Act followed the English Sale of Goods Act, which was intended 
to codify the previously existed common law, on the subject of implied warranties 
of quality. WILLISTON, supra note 114. The U.C.C. provisions on the implied 
warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose have superseded 
the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act. Id. 
 123. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 27, § 1:4. 
 124. See generally U.C.C. §§ 2-314 and 2-315. The applicability of one 
warranty over another depends on whether the buyer’s purpose is “ordinary” or 
“particular.” This is a significant distinction when goods are fit for ordinary 
purposes, thus satisfying the warranty of merchantability, but are otherwise unfit 
for the buyer’s particular purpose, thus breaching the warranty of fitness. Vincent 
M. Gonzales, The Buyer’s Specifications Exception to the Implied Warranty of 
Fitness for a Particular Purpose: Design or Performance?, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 
237, 249 (1987). According to the legislative commentary, a particular purpose 
differs from an ordinary purpose because a particular purpose envisions a buyer’s 
specific use “which is peculiar to the nature of his business,” whereas an ordinary 
purpose entails “uses which are customarily made of the goods in question.” See 
U.C.C. § 2-315 cmt. 2. 
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from loss resulting from the sale of goods below commercial standards or 
unfit for the buyer’s particular purpose.125 
The warranty of merchantability provides, in relevant part, that if the 
seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind, the goods must be 
fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are normally used.126 A 
breach of the warranty of merchantability “will be readily found . . . where 
the goods are so obviously defective that they are not suitable for any of 
their ordinary uses or at least for their principal use.”127 The absence of a 
manifested defect precludes a cognizable claim for breach of the implied 
warranty of merchantability.128 Thus, under the U.C.C., a product is fit for 
ordinary use when it is free from defects that would inhibit its use.129 In 
contrast, when an action is based on breach of warranty of fitness, the 
product may be entirely free from defects yet unfit for the particular 
purpose that the buyer intends.130 Thus, the common law’s warranty of 
fitness for particular purpose exists, as under Louisiana law, irrespective 
of the existence of a defect.131 
Although courts originally conceived the warranty of merchantability 
as one in tort,132 courts today generally recognize that breach of an implied 
warranty can sound in either contract or tort, depending on the 
                                                                                                             
 125. WILLISTON, supra note 114. 
 126. U.C.C. § 2-314. See WILLISTON, supra note 114, § 52:77. “Ordinary 
purposes” include those the manufacturer or seller intended and those that are 
reasonably foreseeable. Id. 
 127. WILLISTON, supra note 114, § 52:77. Goods are not fit for their ordinary 
purposes “when they break or need frequent or extensive repairs early on when 
used in an ordinary manner; [or] when they are completely useless and therefore 
unfit for any purpose.” 26 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS § 6 (2d ed. 2017). 
 128. In re Air Bag Products Liability Litigation, 7 F. Supp. 2d 792, 805 (E.D. 
La. 1998). It is well established that “[p]urchasers of an allegedly defective 
product have no legally recognizable claim where the alleged defect has not 
manifested itself in the product they own.” Id. (quoting Hubbard v. General 
Motors Corp, 1996 WL 274018, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1996)). 
 129. See, e.g., Rudolph v. Huckman, 267 A.2d 896 (Del. 1970) (holding that a 
boat is not of merchantable quality when, because of numerous defects, it cannot 
be used); see also Limestone Farms, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 29 P.3d 457, 461 (Kan. 
2001) (“Implied warranties arise by operation of law . . . their purpose being to 
protect a consumer from loss where merchandise fails to meet normal commercial 
standards.”). 
 130. Barazzotto v. Intelligent Sys., Inc., 532 N.E.2d 148, 150 (Oh. Ct. App. 1987). 
 131. See generally U.C.C. § 2-315; see also discussion infra Part II.B. 
 132. H.B. 106, 1993 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 841. 
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circumstances.133 In either event, the contractual warranty of 
merchantability serves as a rough analogue to Louisiana’s warranty 
against redhibitory defects in the context of sales of goods, providing the 
buyer with a remedy if the goods sold to him do not conform to the 
accepted standards of quality, just as the contractual warranty of fitness is 
an analogue to Louisiana’s warranty of fitness for particular use.134 
D. Impetus of Codification 
In 1985, under the leadership of Professor Saul Litvinoff, the 
Louisiana State Law Institute135 commenced a wholesale revision of the 
law of sales with the goal of modernizing the law.136 Because Louisiana 
had experienced vast societal changes since the enactment of the sales title, 
the Law Institute deemed a wholesale revision of the law appropriate.137 
National and international legislative innovations in the law of sales stood 
in clear contrast to Louisiana’s outdated provisions.138 Article 2 of the 
U.C.C. and the 1980 Convention on International Sales served as models 
for the Law Institute, offering practical approaches to contemporary sales 
problems.139 The revision embraced several Article 2 provisions, but the 
                                                                                                             
 133. See, e.g., JCW Elecs., Inc. v. Garza, 257 S.W.3d 701, 704 (Tex. 2008). 
Courts identify the nature of the claim by examining the damages alleged—if the 
damages alleged are purely economic, the claim is contractual; if the damages 
alleged are for personal injury, the claim is tortious. Id. at 705. 
 134. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2524 (2018); U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 
2-315. 
 135. The Louisiana State Law Institute is an official advisory law revision 
commission, law reform agency, and legal research agency of the State of 
Louisiana. LA. REV. STAT. § 24:201 (2018). 
 136. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 27, § 1:6. The Law 
Institute initiated the sales revision as part of the ongoing revision of the Louisiana 
Civil Code. Id. Professor Litvinoff drafted revision proposals for consideration, 
which the Council of the Louisiana State Law Institute either accepted or rejected 
after extensive discussion. Id. 
 137. J. Peter Kovata, The Revision of the Louisiana Civil Code Sales Title: In 
Many Ways a Non-Event, 40 LOY. L. REV. 139 (1994); see also TOOLEY-
KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 27, § 1:6. 
 138. H.B. 106, 1993 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 841. 
 139. Id. The Law Institute debated adopting Article 2 of the U.C.C. in globo, 
but the Council ultimately decided that certain common law provisions were 
inconsistent with fundamental principles of Louisiana law. Id. 
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drafters professed to retain the basic civilian character of the Louisiana 
law of sales,140 preserving redhibition as a Louisiana institution.141 
Although the sales revision project commenced in 1985,142 the idea of 
adopting a separate warranty of fitness was not introduced until 1989 
when, in considering the definitional article for redhibition, a Law Institute 
Council member moved to remove the idea of fitness from the law of 
redhibition and to create a stand-alone warranty encompassing the 
concept.143 Because of redhibition’s similarity to the warranty of 
merchantability,144 this Council member presumably desired to 
incorporate the warranty of fitness for particular use into Louisiana’s law, 
although the minutes of the Council meeting indicate that the Council did 
not discuss the distinction between merchantability and fitness.145 
Thereafter, the Council requested that the project’s reporter, Professor 
Litvinoff, consider the possibility of creating a separate warranty of fitness 
distinct from the warranty of redhibition.146 Professor Litvinoff complied 
with this request and assessed the need for such a warranty.147 Ultimately, 
Professor Litvinoff recommended the Sales Committee avoid this 
approach, finding the adoption of the warranty of fitness in Louisiana both 
unnecessary and potentially problematic.148 In a memorandum to his 
Committee, Professor Litvinoff recommended as follows: 
It seems to the Reporter that adoption by the Council of the 
warranty of fitness as a separate warranty in the Louisiana law of 
sales would carry the danger of introducing ‘through the back 
door’ the tort approach of the U.C.C. into the Louisiana law of 
redhibition. This could wreak veritable havoc in the law, one of 
                                                                                                             
 140. Id. 
 141. Odinet, supra note 62, at 766. “Not eager to be completely submerged 
under the common law waters, Louisiana chose to moor itself to the ancient civil 
law institution of redhibition.” Id. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 142. LA. STATE L. INST., MEETING OF THE COUNCIL, Revision of the Law of 
Sales: Redhibition, at 4 (May 19–20, 1989). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
 145. See generally supra note 142. 
 146. LA. STATE L. INST., REVISION OF THE LAW OF SALES: WARRANTY OF 
FITNESS, No. 8-1-89, at 1 (Nov. 17–18, 1989) (prepared for Meeting of the 
Council by Saul Litvinoff, Reporter). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. (“At the meeting of May, 1989 the Reporter was asked to give some 
Summer thoughts to the possibility of incorporating into the articles on redhibition 
a separate warranty of fitness of a thing for its intended use. The Reporter has 
done so and reached the conclusion that no such warranty is needed.”). 
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the probable results of which would be the demise of the law of 
redhibition. On the other hand, the Reporter sees no need for 
introducing legislation on the warranty of fitness, since, in the 
Reporter’s opinion, the proposed articles on redhibition strike a 
fair balance between the interests of buyer and seller and are 
suitable for solving most of the problems that arise in this area.149 
By stating that the proposed redhibition articles would solve most 
potential problems,150 Professor Litvinoff likely meant that Louisiana law 
adequately remedied the sale of both defective and non-defective goods 
without a separate warranty of fitness.151 He recognized that Louisiana 
courts already acknowledged the role that fitness—in the sense of 
merchantability—played in redhibition.152 Moreover, the revision effort 
already addressed any concern about leaving a buyer unprotected when he 
purchased a thing that, although not defective, did not conform to his 
expectations.153 Thus, no gap in the law existed to justify the adoption of 
the warranty of fitness as a stand-alone warranty; redhibition already 
encompassed fitness for ordinary use, and the law could handle problems 
of non-redhibitory, but otherwise non-conforming, goods as breach of 
contract claims.154 
Despite Professor Litvinoff’s view, he anticipated that other 
committee members would feel differently.155 As such, he proposed two 
variations of a warranty of fitness article, both sourced from the U.C.C.156 
The first proposed article stated: 
                                                                                                             
 149. Id. at 6. 
 150. Id. 
 151. See infra text accompanying notes 152–54. 
 152. LA. STATE L. INST., supra note 146, at 6 (prepared for Meeting of the 
Council by Saul Litvinoff, Reporter). See discussion supra Part I.B.2. 
 153. The Council adopted current article 2529, which provides for contractual 
damages when a thing sold is free from redhibitory defects but otherwise not of 
the kind or quality specified in the contract, prior to Professor Litvinoff’s 
recommendation. LA. STATE L. INST., REVISION OF THE LAW OF SALES: 
REDHIBITION, No. 7-17-89, at 1 (Nov. 17–18, 1989) (prepared for Meeting of the 
Council by Saul Litvinoff, Reporter). See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2529 (2018) (“When 
the thing the seller has delivered, though in itself free from redhibitory defects, is 
not of the kind or quality specified in the contract or represented by the seller, the 
rights of the buyer are governed by other rules of sale and conventional 
obligations.”). Even without this article, however, the same result exists under 
sales law and the law of conventional obligations. 
 154. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2529. 
 155. See LA. STATE L. INST., supra note 146. 
 156. Id. 
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The seller warrants that the thing sold is reasonably fit [for its 
ordinary purpose] [for the ordinary use of which such thing is 
susceptible] [for its intended use].157 
An alternate draft included an additional sentence: 
When the seller has reason to know the buyer’s particular purpose 
in buying the thing and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill 
or judgment in selecting it, the seller warrants the thing selected is 
fit for the buyer’s particular purpose.158 
Neither alternative contemplated that the general rules of conventional 
obligations, rather than the law of redhibition, would govern noncompliance 
with the warranty.159 Instead, the proposed articles remained silent on the 
matter,160 indicating that the warranty of fitness would be afforded the same 
treatment as the warranty of redhibition. 
When the Council finally considered the proposed warranty of fitness 
article, Professor Litvinoff stated that Louisiana courts recognized the 
existence of a warranty of fitness, but he suggested that “it wasn’t clear 
from the cases whether the warranty of fitness [was] part of redhibition or 
whether it [was] something independent from redhibition.”161 One Council 
member opined that a distinction existed between the warranties of fitness 
and redhibition and that he therefore saw no danger in bringing U.C.C. 
products liability law “through the back door” by enacting an article 
expressly providing for the warranty of fitness.162 The Council member 
suggested that the warranty of fitness follow redhibition in the Louisiana 
Civil Code as another warranty that the seller owes.163 Subsequently, 
Professor Litvinoff presented the following revised article on the warranty 
of fitness: 
The thing sold must be reasonably fit for its ordinary purpose. 
 
When the seller has reason to know the particular use the buyer 
intends for the thing, or the buyer’s particular purpose for buying 
the thing, and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or 
judgment in selecting it, the thing sold must be fit for the buyer’s 
                                                                                                             
 157. Id. at 7. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. at 6. 
 160. Id. at 7. 
 161. LA. STATE L. INST., MEETING OF THE COUNCIL, at 4 (May 18–19, 1990). 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
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intended use or for his particular purpose. 
 
If the thing is not so fit, the buyer’s rights are governed by the 
general rules of conventional obligations.164 
One Council member noted that the article addressed a thing that is 
not, in itself, defective and proposed a comment to that effect.165 Another 
member moved to adopt the proposed article with a change in the first 
paragraph from “purpose” to “use,” and the motion carried—the warranty 
of fitness was adopted by the Council.166 
The Council may not have fully understood that the new article 
incorporated two stand-alone warranties, namely, the warranty of fitness 
for ordinary use and the warranty of fitness for particular use.167 The 
Council considered the two warranties of fitness, as well as the potential 
overlap with redhibition in globo, failing to consider the separate 
ramifications of each.168 Given that redhibition already encompassed the 
warranty of fitness for ordinary use and that the warranty of fitness for 
particular use had not previously existed,169 the Council may have meant 
to incorporate the warranty of fitness for particular use but failed to 
differentiate it from the warranty of fitness for ordinary use.170 Although 
the Law Institute failed to acknowledge the gravity of its decision,171 a 
number of scholars foresaw the complications that the adoption of the 
stand-alone warranty of fitness would cause in Louisiana.172 
E. Twenty-Five Years Ago: A Prediction Foretold  
Even before the legislative enactment of the warranty of fitness 
became effective, scholars called for clarification.173 In 1993, Professor 
George Bilbe of Loyola Law School wrote an article in which he referred 
to article 2524 as “what may be the most significant article in the 
                                                                                                             
 164. Id. at 5. 
 165. Id. The Council did not adopt such a comment. See generally LA. CIV. 
CODE art. 2524 (2018). 
 166. LA. STATE L. INST., supra note 161, at 5. 
 167. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524. 
 168. See LA. STATE L. INST., supra note 161. 
 169. See supra text accompanying notes 152–54. 
 170. See LA. STATE L. INST., supra note 161. 
 171. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. a (2018) (declaring that the 
article does not change the law). 
 172. See, e.g., Bilbe, supra note 20, at 147. 
 173. See id. 
304 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
 
 
revision.”174 In examining both the traditional concepts of redhibition and 
the newly codified warranties, Bilbe endeavored to locate the provisions 
in the revision that needed clarification or refinement.175 Analyzing the 
assertion that article 2524 did not change the law, Professor Bilbe 
accurately anticipated that “the Law Institute may have done much more 
than its comment suggests.”176 He pointed out that “[b]ecause things 
having redhibitory defects are ‘useless’ or have significantly diminished 
‘usefulness’ or ‘value,’ the legislation contains a definitional overlap in 
that the presence of redhibitory defects results in the absence of reasonable 
fitness for ordinary use.”177 Bilbe further recognized that the overlap 
presented difficulties concerning remedies because the breach of the 
warranty of fitness for ordinary use allows recovery of full contract 
damages, whereas redhibition limits a buyer’s remedies to return of the 
purchase price and incidental expenses.178 
Professor Bilbe argued that in cases of good faith sellers of defective 
items, a change in the law appeared unavoidable. A good faith seller was 
not responsible for damages resulting from redhibitory defects, but under 
the new law, the aggrieved buyer could seek damages and dissolution of 
the sale under the warranty of fitness for ordinary use.179 Accordingly, 
buyers of defective goods would assert that the good faith sellers breached 
the warranty of fitness for ordinary use rather than bring a claim in 
redhibition.180 Relying on the circular reasoning surrounding the doctrine 
of fitness, buyers might argue that if the defects are redhibitory, the goods 
will be unfit for ordinary use.181 Bilbe thus envisioned that “the revision 
may well afford an alternative more lucrative than an action in redhibition 
in every instance where items are affected by redhibitory defects.”182 
Indeed, augmenting the warranty of fitness at the expense of redhibition 
would yield unacceptable results given redhibition’s fundamental role in 
Louisiana law.183 
Professor Bilbe also considered whether courts would recognize the 
breach of the warranty of fitness for ordinary use in situations that the law 
                                                                                                             
 174. Id. at 138. 
 175. Id. at 125. 
 176. Id. at 138–39.  
 177. Id. at 146–47. 
 178. Id. at 147. 
 179. Id. at 140. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 140–41. 
 183. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
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of redhibition already remedied.184 He predicted that if courts were to deny 
actions for breach of the warranty of fitness for ordinary use when the 
unfitness was a result of a redhibitory defect, the warranty of fitness for 
ordinary use would apply in relatively few, if any, situations.185 Moreover, 
an anomalous situation would exist in which buyers who desired greater 
recoveries would assert that the items they purchased were initially 
without defects, whereas sellers would contend that the items were 
defective on the date of sale.186 Accordingly, Bilbe concluded that “[t]he 
issue call[ed] for legislative clarification.”187 Revisiting a number of the 
problems he identified, one thing is clear: 25 years later, the evermore 
confusing issue continues to call for legislative clarification.188 
II. THE FALLOUT 
The revised sales law, which went into effect on January 1, 1995,189 
was ostensibly only a “facelift” that updated and recast the sales articles 
in clear language.190 Despite purporting to leave the foundations of the law 
intact,191 the revision has wreaked havoc in the realm of Louisiana’s sales 
warranties.192 The recognition of contractual remedies for breach of the 
warranty of fitness effected a substantial change in the law, as the 
subsequent jurisprudence indicates.193 Whereas before 1995, the warranty 
                                                                                                             
 184. Bilbe, supra note 20, at 141. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. Whereas a cognizable claim in redhibition requires the defect to be 
non-apparent, unknown to the buyer, and to have existed at the time of the sale, a 
claim for breach of the warranty of fitness has no such requirements. See generally 
LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2522, 2524 (2018). 
 187. Bilbe, supra note 20, at 147. 
 188. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 189. H.B. 106, 1993 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 841. 
 190. TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 27, § 1:6. Professor Litvinoff 
noted, “In spite of their age, the old articles did not deserve to be totally 
eliminated. What was needed was a major overhaul; a structural and functional 
renovation that left the foundations intact.” Id. 
 191. The legislature disclaims any intention of changing the law through the 
enactment of the warranty of fitness. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. CODE art. 2524 
cmt. a (2018) (“This Article is new. It does not change the law, however. It gives 
express formulation to the seller’s obligation of delivering to the buyer a thing 
that is reasonably fit for its ordinary use. The Louisiana jurisprudence has 
recognized the existence of that obligation . . . .”). 
 192. See TOOLEY-KNOBLETT & GRUNING, supra note 27, § 1:6. 
 193. Bilbe, supra note 20, at 140. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2018); 
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. a. 
306 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
 
 
of fitness existed only as “either a jurisprudential gloss on redhibition or 
as a casual independent statement of the court on the responsibilities of the 
seller,”194 the revision removed fitness from redhibition entirely, resulting 
in two independent warranties195 with separate legal frameworks where 
there was previously only one.196 
Moreover, “warranty of fitness for ordinary use” has not developed an 
independent meaning in Louisiana during the last decade.197 No articulable 
legislative definition exists, and the jurisprudence is not helpful; courts 
prior to revision equated fitness with redhibition, and courts subsequent to 
the revision experienced difficulty distinguishing between the 
warranties.198 Because of the definitional overlap between ordinary fitness 
and redhibition, courts have struggled to determine whether the warranties 
are mutually exclusive or, rather, can be breached by the same set of facts, 
leaving buyers and sellers across the state subject to vastly different rights 
and obligations.199 
A. Fitness for Ordinary Use: Codified Confusion 
The warranty of fitness for ordinary use is neither an independent nor 
a meaningful addition to Louisiana law; it has always been present in the 
case law, and its applicability has always been ambiguous.200 Despite the 
valiant efforts of the courts,201 the warranty of fitness for ordinary use 
remains incompatible with Louisiana law, both doctrinally and 
                                                                                                             
 194. Odinet, supra note 62, at 764. 
 195. Id. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2524. 
 196. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1994, 1995, 2013, 2524, 2531, 2534, 2541. 
 197. See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
 198. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. a; see, e.g., Sw. La. Hosp. Ass’n v. 
BASF Constr. Chems., LLC, 947 F. Supp. 2d 661, 701 (W.D. La. 2013) (“[I]n 
contrast, a product is not fit for ordinary use ‘[w]hen the seller has reason to know 
the particular use the buyer intends for the thing, or the buyer’s particular purpose 
for buying the thing, and that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment 
in selecting it.’”); Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 
Inc., 262 So. 2d 377, 380 (La. 1972) (“Two warranty obligations are inherent in 
every sale, the warranty of merchantable title and the warranty of reasonable 
fitness for the product’s intended use.”); Jackson v. Breard Motor Co., 167 La. 
857, 120 So. 478, 478 (1929) (in a redhibitory action, the court stated, 
“Automobile which is not in running condition does not comply with warranty of 
fitness for intended purpose”). 
 199. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
 200. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. a. 
 201. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 246–50. 
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practically,202 in part because it is the product of an entirely different legal 
system—the common law system.203 Louisiana imported the common law 
concept of ordinary fitness without appreciating that it was already 
ingrained in the law and without ascribing to it any independent 
meaning.204 In addition, because things having redhibitory defects are, by 
definition, useless or have significantly diminished usefulness or value, 
the legislation governing the warranties of redhibition and fitness for 
ordinary use contains a definitional overlap: the presence of a redhibitory 
defect results necessarily in the absence of fitness for ordinary use.205 
Consequently, the warranty of fitness for ordinary use will never develop 
in Louisiana where defective goods are governed adequately under the 
laws of redhibition.206 
Moreover, because the legal frameworks applicable to fitness and 
redhibition differ substantially207 and neither the legislation nor the 
doctrine provides a sensible distinction between the two, courts have 
struggled to set outer limits for the applicability of each warranty.208 The 
lack of guidance has caused inevitable inconsistency throughout the 
jurisprudence, further intensifying the confusion.209 
1. Fitness for Ordinary Use and Redhibition: The Confusing Overlap 
To date, no court has articulated an adequate distinction between the 
warranties of fitness for ordinary use and redhibition in a way that 
facilitates a coherent and reliable enforcement of rights,210 likely because 
no meaningful distinction exists. The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of 
                                                                                                             
 202. See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
 203. Since fitness for ordinary use is defined in terms of defects, it has no place 
in Louisiana, where the laws of redhibition adequately govern defective goods. 
See discussion supra Part I.C. 
 204. See discussion supra Part I.D. 
 205. Logically, the presence of a redhibitory defect results in the absence of 
fitness for ordinary use. Bilbe, supra note 20, at 147. See H.B. 106, 1993 La. Sess. 
Law Serv. Act 841. 
 206. See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
 207. See discussion infra Part II.A.2. 
 208. See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
 209. See, e.g., Cassidy v. Ford Motor Co., No. 15-2483, 2016 WL 687621 
(E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2016); Sw. La. Hosp. Ass’n v. BASF Constr. Chems., LLC, 
947 F. Supp. 2d 661 (W.D. La. 2013); Justiss Oil Co. v. T3 Energy Servs., Inc., 
No. 1:07-cv-01745, 2011 WL 539135 (W.D. La. Feb. 7, 2011); Fontenot v. Saxby, 
34 So. 3d 477 (La. Ct. App. 2010); Cunard Line Co. v. Datrex, Inc., 926 So. 2d 
109 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
 210. See discussion infra Part II.A.1. 
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Appeal set forth the best attempt at a distinction between the warranties in 
Cunard Limited Line Co. v. Datrex, Inc., stating, “[W]e conclude that 
[article 2524] applies to a situation in which the cause of action is based, 
not on the defective nature of the thing at issue, but on its fitness for 
ordinary use and/or for a particular use or purpose.”211 The court’s 
language suggests that a thing is unfit for use only if it is not also 
defective.212 
In Cunard, the court addressed a dispute over the applicable 
prescriptive period for an action related to defective lighting systems on 
cruise ships.213 Cunard Line Co. (“Cunard”) purchased lighting systems 
from Datrex for installation on its cruise ships to comply with International 
Maritime Organization regulations.214 Following installation, Cunard sued 
Datrex, alleging that a number of problems developed immediately, 
“including, but not limited to, shorting out” and also that the Coast Guard 
found the systems did not comply with safety standards.215 
On appeal, Cunard argued that the warranty of fitness provided an 
alternative cause of action for defective products—along with an 
additional prescriptive period of ten years—to a cause of action in 
redhibition.216 Cunard argued that its claim fell within the ambit of article 
2524 for two reasons: (1) the Datrex system was unfit for ordinary use on 
a cruise ship; and (2) it relied on Datrex’s skill in selecting the system, and 
Datrex was aware that Cunard’s particular purpose for installing the 
system was compliance with the regulations.217 In essence, Cunard argued 
that its claim fell under the warranty of fitness for either ordinary or 
particular use.218 The court disagreed, noting that Cunard’s cause of action 
arose out of the allegedly defective condition of the lighting systems.219 It 
                                                                                                             
 211. Cunard Line Co., 926 So. 2d at 114. 
 212. Id. See also Stroderd v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., No. 04-3050, 2005 
WL 2037419, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2005) (“[A] breach of contract of fitness for 
ordinary use claim is only an independent cause of action when an item is free 
from redhibitory defects.”); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Indus. Laminates Corp., 664 F.2d 
1332, 1335 (5th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he courts in Louisiana have held unequivocally 
that actions based on a breach of warranty against defects are to be brought in 
redhibition instead of as a breach of contract.”). 
 213. Cunard Line Co., 926 So. 2d 109. 
 214. Id. at 111. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. at 112. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. at 113. The court found significance in Cunard’s failure to demonstrate 
that a properly functioning Datrex system would fail to meet either International 
Maritime Organization requirements or Cunard’s needs or purposes. Id. 
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concluded that the systems were not suitable for ordinary use or for 
Cunard’s particular purpose because they were defective, which put his 
claim squarely within the ambit of redhibition.220 Rather than clarifying 
what warranty of fitness for ordinary use meant or was intended to address, 
the court explained only what the warranty did not mean, emphasizing that 
the warranty of fitness for ordinary use is not another version of the 
warranty of redhibition.221 
 In contrast, many decisions equate breach of the warranty of fitness 
with the existence of a defect in the thing.222 The Exposé des Motifs 
accompanying the Sales Revision cites multiple cases as authority223 for 
the proposition that prior to the revision, judges formulated a warranty of 
fitness that was seemingly indistinguishable from the warranty against 
latent defects.224 Indeed, even the two cases that the Exposé des Motifs 
                                                                                                             
 220. Id. Unlike the breach of warranty of fitness for ordinary use, the breach 
of the warranty of fitness for particular use is not dependent on the existence of a 
defect. The existence of a defect, however, may put a buyer’s claim within the 
ambit of redhibition as opposed to fitness for particular use. See generally LA. 
CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2524 (2018). 
 221. Cunard Line Co., 926 So. 2d at 113. 
 222. LA. STATE L. INST., supra note 146, at 5 (prepared for Meeting of the 
Council by Saul Litvinoff, Reporter). 
 223. See, e.g., Crawford v. Abbott Auto. Co., 101 So. 871 (La. 1924) (“Unless 
warranty be expressly waived, the vendor warrants that the thing sold is fit for the 
purpose intended.”); Jackson v. Breard Motor Co., 120 So. 478, 479 (La. 1929) 
(“Automobile which is not in running condition does not comply with warranty 
of fitness for intended purpose.”) (the action was one in redhibition); Falk v. Luke 
Motor Co., 112 So. 2d 683, 989 (La. 1959) (“[A]s is commonly known, a car 
which will not run or which runs intermittently, requiring the frequent attention 
of a mechanic to keep it going is an abomination and is manifestly not fit or 
acceptable for the purposes intended.”); Bartolotta v. Gambino, 78 So. 2d 208, 
211–12 (La. Ct. App. 1955) (“[A]ll that the buyer need show is the actual 
existence of such defects as render[ed] the article unsuitable for its intended 
uses.”); Cosey v. Cambre, 204 So. 2d 97, 100 (La. Ct. App. 1967) (“[P]urchaser 
of an automobile is entitled to receive a vehicle which will meet his needs, and 
[a] car which is not in running condition is not fit for the purposes intended by the 
buyer.”); Craig v. Burch, 228 So. 2d 723, 728 (La. Ct. App. 1969) (“[V]endor 
warrants the thing sold to be fit for its intended purpose.”); Radalec Inc. v. 
Automatic Firing Corp., 81 So. 2d 830 (La. 1955) (in which the defense to the suit 
is founded on three grounds, one of which being that the action of redhibition will 
not lie because the implied warranty of fitness of the units has been fulfilled); 
Media Prod. Consultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 262 So. 2d 377 
(La. 1972) (“[T]he rule may also be applied . . . to new automobile that proves 
unfit for use because of latent defects.”). 
 224. H.B. 106, 1993 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 841. 
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cites as recognizing a stand-alone warranty of fitness225  did not 
meaningfully distinguish between ordinary fitness and redhibition.226 
Instead, the court in both cases made broad statements regarding the 
warranty of fitness alongside traditional declarations about redhibition.227 
In Rey v. Cuccia, the buyer of a camper-trailer sought to recover from 
the seller on grounds of redhibition because the trailer had come apart 
shortly after being put to use.228 After conducting a typical redhibition 
analysis, the Louisiana Supreme Court stated, “In Louisiana sales, the seller 
is bound by an implied warranty that the thing sold is free of hidden defects 
and is reasonably fit for the product’s intended use.”229 Although the court 
acknowledged that both warranties are implied in every sale, it failed to 
recognize any rights or duties the warranty of fitness creates beyond those 
imposed under the warranty of redhibition, concluding that the trailer 
contained redhibitory defects at the time of the sale.230 Thus, even if the 
court named the warranty of fitness separate from the warranty of 
redhibition, such nominal recognition did not affect the case’s outcome.231 
Subsequently, in Hob’s Refrigeration & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. 
Poche, the seller of a home-air conditioner compressor sued to recover on 
an open account.232 On appeal, the litigants disputed the duration, rather 
than the existence or breach, of the warranty of fitness.233 Citing Rey, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court again stated that “the seller is bound by an 
implied warranty that the thing sold is free of hidden defects and is 
reasonably fit for the product’s intended use.”234 The court affirmed the 
                                                                                                             
 225. Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974); Hob’s Refrigeration & Air 
Conditioning v. Poche, 293 So. 2d 546 (La. 1974).  
 226. H.B. 106, 1993 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 841. If anything, these two cases 
depict the Louisiana Supreme Court’s embracement of the warranty of fitness for 
particular use (as opposed to ordinary use). See discussion infra note 234. 
 227. Odinet, supra note 62, at 762. 
 228. Rey, 298 So. 2d at 840. 
 229. Id. at 842. The Court also established that where a thing becomes unfit 
for its intended purpose during normal and foreseeable use, and no abnormal and 
unforeseeable use or intervening cause is proven, a strong inference arises that the 
thing contained a defect, regardless of whether the actual cause of the unfitness or 
defect is proven. Id. at 845. 
 230. Bilbe, supra note 20, at 138; see Rey, 298 So. 2d at 840. 
 231. Rey, 298 So. 2d at 845. 
 232. Hob’s Refrigeration & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Poche, 304 So. 2d 326 
(La. 1974). 
 233. Id. at 327. 
 234. Id. In both Rey and Hob’s Refrigeration, the Court stated that the product 
must be “reasonably fit for [its] intended use.” Rey, 298 So. 2d at 842; Hob’s, 304 
So. 2d at 327 (emphasis added). Arguably, then, the Introduction is correct that 
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trial court’s finding that the compressor did not comply with the implied 
warranty of fitness with which it was purchased because “[a] compressor 
purchased for $450 for a home-air conditioner should reasonably be 
expected to last longer than three months, even though purchased as a 
rebuilt unit.”235 Again, the court acknowledged no difference in the law 
governing fitness and redhibition.236 Hob’s Refrigeration offers only a 
minor contribution to a legal understanding of the warranty of fitness; it 
merely conveys that a thing reasonably fit for its ordinary purpose should 
be “reasonably expected to last.”237 
This senseless rhetoric, though problematic, is not inexplicable given 
the lack of legislative guidance as to the relationship between the 
warranties of fitness for ordinary use and redhibition.238 A plain reading of 
the articles reveals nothing about the interplay between redhibition and 
fitness.239 The commentary to the warranty of fitness article provides that 
“when the thing sold is not fit for its ordinary use, even though it is free 
from redhibitory defects, the buyer may seek dissolution of the sale and 
damages, or just damages, under the general rules of conventional 
obligations.”240 In such a case, the buyer’s action is one for breach of 
contract rather than redhibition.241 This language suggests that the 
warranty of fitness applies only when the warranty of redhibition does not. 
In other words, being “unfit for ordinary use” excludes defective things.242 
On the other hand, the warranty of kind and quality, which the legislature 
also adopted during the revision, provides expressly that preference is to 
be given to the warranty of redhibition over the warranty set forth therein, 
clearly indicating that the two warranties are separate and distinct.243 If the 
legislature intended for the same inference to apply to the warranty of 
fitness, it would have likely included the same explicit language.244 The 
                                                                                                             
the two cases created a stand-alone warranty of fitness—the warranty of fitness 
for particular use. See H.B. 106, 1993 La. Sess. Law Serv. Act 841. 
 235. Hob’s Refrigeration, 304 So. 2d at 328. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. See supra text accompanying notes 210–21; see also infra text 
accompanying notes 239-50. 
 239. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2524 (2018). 
 240. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2524 cmt. b (2018) (emphasis added). 
 241. Id. 
 242. See id. 
 243. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2529. 
 244. Id. (“When the thing the seller has delivered, though in itself free from 
redhibitory defects . . . .”). 
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ambiguous language set forth in the Code, however, provides little guidance 
as to the interplay between the warranties of fitness and redhibition.245 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to find an example of a thing that is 
not defective but is unfit for ordinary use, although some courts have tried 
to force a distinction in accordance with the structure of the Code.246 In 
Cunard, for example, the issue of whether the warranty of fitness was 
intended to encompass the warranty against redhibitory defects, providing 
an additional cause of action for defective products, was res nova before 
the Louisiana Third Circuit.247 After construing the statute and considering 
legislative intent, the court found that the legislature intended to separate 
and categorize the different types of warranties applicable to sales rather 
than have all such warranties placed in the category of redhibition by 
default,248 noting that: 
It is apparent that the legislature intended by Act 841 to address 
and clarify any confusion between the warranty against 
redhibitory defects and the warranty of fitness for ordinary use 
and/or for a particular use or purpose by enacting La. Civ. Code 
art. 2524 as a separate and distinct Article from La. Civ. Code art. 
2520. It would appear superfluous or redundant for the legislature 
to have enacted two warranty statutes addressing the same subject 
matter, with no mention or indication of its reasoning for the 
overlap, such as to provide for an election of remedies and 
prescriptive periods.249 
Evidently, the court felt compelled to give the warranty of fitness for 
ordinary use independent meaning, even though the revision purported not 
to change the law, and even though it is almost impossible to formulate a 
distinction.250 
                                                                                                             
 245. See generally id. arts. 2520, 2524. 
 246. See, e.g., Cunard Line Co. v. Datrex, Inc., 926 So. 2d 109 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
 247. Id. at 113. 
 248. Id. at 114. 
 249. Id. at 113–14. 
 250. Id. Under this approach, the warranty of fitness applies exclusively to 
things that do not suffer from redhibitory defects but are otherwise unfit for 
ordinary use. Id. This approach begs the question of how something can be free 
from defects prohibiting its use or substantially diminishing its usefulness or value 
but simultaneously be unfit for its ordinary use. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 
2520, 2524. 
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2. The Consequence of the Overlap: Effects of Classification 
The lack of a meaningful distinction between a thing unfit for ordinary 
use and one that suffers from a redhibitory defect would be of little 
consequence if the legislature had subjected the breach of the warranty of 
fitness for ordinary use to the same treatment as the breach of the warranty 
against redhibition. The distinction, though intellectually puzzling, would 
have no practical importance. Regardless of the source of the seller’s 
liability, the result would be the same in terms of remedies and time 
limitations.251 Rather than align the frameworks of fitness and redhibition, 
however, the legislature imposed a separate framework for fitness such 
that the pertinent rights, obligations, and remedies available to parties vary 
depending on the classification of their claim.252 
To prevail in an action for redhibition, the buyer must establish a 
number of elements: (1) that a redhibitory defect existed in the thing 
sold;253 (2) that he neither knew of the defect nor was it apparent;254 (3) 
that the defect existed at the time of delivery;255 and (4) that the seller could 
                                                                                                             
 251. See id. arts. 2520–22, 2524, 2530–32, 2534, 2537–38, 2540–2541, 2545, 
2548. 
 252. See id. 
 253. Id. art. 2520. A defect is redhibitory when: (1) “it renders the thing 
useless, or its use so inconvenient that it must be presumed that a buyer would not 
have bought the thing had he known of the defect”; or (2) “without rendering the 
thing totally useless, it diminishes its usefulness or its value so that it must be 
presumed that a buyer would still have bought it but for a lesser price.” Id. 
Apparent defects are not redhibitory vices. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2521 cmt. a 
(2018). 
 254. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2521 (“The seller owes no warranty for defects in the 
thing that were known to the buyer at the time of the sale, or for defects that should 
have been discovered by a reasonably prudent buyer of such things.”). Apparent 
defects are not redhibitory vices. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2521 cmt. a. An 
“apparent defect” is one that a reasonably prudent buyer, acting under similar 
circumstances, would discover by simple inspection of the thing. Royal v. Cook, 
984 So. 2d 156, 163 (La. Ct. App. 2008). In determining whether an inspection is 
reasonable, a court should consider the buyer’s knowledge and expertise, 
opportunity for inspection, and assurances the seller made. Id. But see LA. CIV. 
CODE ANN. art. 2521 cmt. d (“Under this Article the buyer must make more than 
a casual observation of the object; he must examine the thing to ascertain its 
soundness.”). Regardless of the gravity of the defects, the seller is not responsible 
for defects of which the buyer was aware, either because the seller disclosed it or 
because the buyer discovered it himself. Id. art. 2521 cmts. b, f. 
 255. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2530. The defect is presumed to have existed at the 
time of delivery if it appears within three days. Id. Even if a defect appears after 
three days from the date of delivery, the nature of the defect may allow the court 
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not or would not correct the defect when given the opportunity to do so.256 
A buyer with a successful redhibition claim257 is entitled to either 
rescission of the sale or reduction of the purchase price, depending on the 
nature and extent of the defect.258 As long as the seller had no actual 
knowledge of the defect, the buyer must give him notice and an 
opportunity to repair the defect,259 and the seller is bound to do so.260 If the 
seller fails to repair or remedy the defect, he must return the purchase price 
with interest and pay a reimbursement for the reasonable expenses 
occasioned by the sale and preservation of the thing.261 If the seller knew 
of the redhibitory defect, he is liable to the buyer for the return of the 
purchase price together with interest, reimbursement, damages, and 
attorney fees.262 A seller who is liable in redhibition likewise has an action 
against the manufacturer of the thing for any loss sustained because of the 
redhibitory defect.263 
                                                                                                             
to draw an inference that it existed at the time of delivery. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. 
art. 2530 cmt. c. See, e.g., Perrin v. Read Imports, Inc., 359 So. 2d 738, 741 n.1 
(La. Ct. App. 1978) (“Later-appearing defects do not enjoy that status as a matter 
of law, but in the absence of other explanation, defects which do not usually result 
from ordinary use for the time passed may be inferred to have pre-existed the 
sale.”) (citation omitted). 
 256. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2522 (unless the seller has actual knowledge of the 
existence of a redhibitory defect, the buyer must give the seller timely notice of 
the defect as to allow him the opportunity to make repairs); id. art. 2531 (a seller 
who did not know that the thing he sold had a redhibitory defect is bound to repair 
or correct it). 
 257. The law of redhibition precludes a buyer who knew or should have known 
of the redhibitory defect from obtaining any form of relief. Id. art. 2521. 
 258. Id. art. 2520. A buyer may choose to seek only a reduction of the price 
even when the redhibitory defect is one giving him the right to obtain rescission 
of the sale. Id. art. 2541. On the other hand, when a buyer seeks rescission of a 
sale on the grounds of redhibition, the court may limit the buyer’s remedy to a 
reduction of the price. Id. 
 259. Id. arts. 2522, 2531. 
 260. Id. art. 2531. 
 261. See id. art. 2522 (“A buyer who fails to give that notice suffers diminution 
of the warranty to the extent the seller can show that the defect could have been 
repaired or that the repairs would have been less burdensome, had he received 
timely notice.”). 
 262. Id. art. 2545. The buyer is not required to give notice to a seller who has actual 
knowledge of the existence of a redhibitory defect in the thing sold. Id. art. 2522. 
 263. Id. art. 2531. This warranty cannot be waived. Id. Any contractual 
provision attempting to limit or diminish recovery by a seller against the 
manufacturer has no effect. Id. 
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Unlike the warranty of redhibition, the general rules of conventional 
obligations govern the warranty of fitness.264 Accordingly, a buyer may 
obtain dissolution of the sale and recover compensatory damages265 that 
the seller’s failure to comply with the warranty causes.266 A bad faith seller 
is liable for all damages, foreseeable or not,267 that are a direct 
consequence of his failure to perform.268 A buyer must make reasonable 
efforts to mitigate the damage the seller’s nonperformance causes; if he 
fails to do so, the seller may demand that the damages be reduced 
accordingly.269 A buyer who concealed facts from the seller that he knew 
or should have known would cause a failure of performance may not 
recover damages.270 If the buyer’s negligence contributed to the failure to 
perform, the damages are reduced in proportion to the buyer’s 
negligence.271 Generally, a buyer who alleges breach of warranty of fitness 
may not recover attorney fees.272 
The legislature’s failure to align the frameworks of fitness and redhibition 
has required courts to tease out the distinctions between redhibition and fitness 
for ordinary use to determine the scope and nature of a seller’s liability—an 
impossibly arduous burden.273 Various courts have questioned whether a 
seller may be held liable for breach of warranty of fitness and breach of 
warranty against redhibitory defects simultaneously,274 but unfortunately, 
                                                                                                             
 264. Id.  
 265. Damages consist of the loss the buyer sustained and the profit of which 
he was deprived. Id. art. 1995 
 266. Id. arts. 1994, 1995, 2013. 
 267. “Foreseeable damages are such damages as may fall within the foresight 
of a reasonable man.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1996 cmt. b (2018). 
 268. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1997. Under general contract law, a bad faith obligor 
“intentionally and maliciously fails to perform his obligation,” as opposed to a 
bad faith seller under redhibition, who knows of the defect but fails to declare it. 
See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1997 cmt. b; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2545. 
 269. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2002. 
 270. Id. art. 2003. 
 271. Id. 
 272. It is well-settled in Louisiana that attorney fees are not recoverable unless 
a statute or contract clearly provides for them. See, e.g., Kiefer v. Bernie Dumas 
Buick Co., 210 So. 2d 569 (La. Ct. App. 1968). 
 273. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 274. See, e.g., 425 Notre Dame, LLC v. Kolbe & Kolbe Mill Work Co., No. 
15-454, 2016 WL 1110232, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 22, 2016); Cassidy v. Ford Motor 
Co., No. 15-2483, 2016 WL 687621, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2016); Sw. La. Hosp. 
Ass’n v. BASC Constr. Chems., LLC, 947 F. Supp. 2d 661 (W.D. La. 2013); 
Justiss Oil Co. v. T3 Energy Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-01745, 2011 WL 539135, 
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courts have remained split on the issue. Resolution of the controversy is 
essential, as it dictates the applicable legal framework.275 
According to numerous Louisiana decisions, when a cause of action is 
based on a defect, the buyer is limited to recovery under the laws of 
redhibition, and he may not disguise his grievance as a fitness claim in an 
effort to take advantage of the more favorable law.276 When courts hold 
that the warranty of fitness is entirely distinct from the warranty of 
redhibition,277 redhibition subsumes any otherwise pertinent fitness claim 
because the causes of action are mutually exclusive.278 In Cunard, for 
example, the court held that when a buyer’s action is based on the 
allegedly defective nature of the thing, his recovery is limited to the 
prescriptive period for redhibition, and he may not bring a claim in fitness 
to avail himself of the longer prescriptive period.279 Additionally, in the 
2014 decision of Mouton v. General Power Systems, Inc., the Louisiana 
Third Circuit Court of Appeal noted that a generator that “began to show 
signs that it was defective . . . has proven defective for purposes of 
Louisiana redhibition law[,]” and thus, the buyer’s cause of action lied in 
redhibition.280 Accordingly, the court held that the ten-year prescriptive 
period for conventional obligations was inapplicable.281 
                                                                                                             
at *5 (W.D. La. Feb. 7, 2011); Cunard Line Co. v. Datrex, Inc., 926 So. 2d 109 
(La. Ct. App. 2006). 
 275. See sources cited supra note 274. 
 276. See, e.g., Stroderd v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., No. 04-3040, 2005 
WL 2037419, at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 4, 2005) (“Plaintiffs claim for breach of 
contract of fitness for ordinary use fails for an independent reason as well: it is 
subsumed by Louisiana redhibition law.”); Mouton v. Generac Power Sys., Inc., 
152 So. 3d 985, 990 (La. Ct. App. 2014); Cunard Line Ltd. Co., 926 So. 2d at 114. 
 277. See, e.g., Cunard Line Co., 926 So. 2d at 109; Mouton, 152 So. 3d at 990; 
Chesapeake La., L.P. v. Innovative Wellsite Sys., Inc., No. 12-2963, 2014 WL 
5796794, at *5 (W.D. La. Nov. 6, 2014). 
 278. For example, in 2014, a federal district court held similarly that if a 
product suffers from redhibitory defects, a party’s claims for breach of warranty 
of fitness are subsumed by his claim for breach of warranty against redhibitory 
defects. Chesapeake, 2014 WL 5796794, at *5. 
 279. Cunard Line Co., 926 So. 2d at 114. See also Stroderd, 2005 WL 
2037419, at *3 (“[The] claim of breach of contract of fitness for ordinary use fails 
for an independent reason as well: it is subsumed by Louisiana redhibition law.”); 
Mouton, 152 So. 3d at 990; Hollybrook Cottonseed Processing, LLC v. Carver, 
Inc., 2010 WL 892869, at *8 (W.D. La. 2010); Mumford v. Jackson Nat. Life Ins. 
Co., 2007 WL 7711472, at *4 (La. Ct. App. 2007); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Indus. 
Laminates Corp., 664 F.2d 1332, 1335 (5th Cir. 1982). 
 280. Mouton, 152 So. 3d at 991. 
 281. Id. 
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On the other hand, when courts hold that the warranties of fitness and 
redhibition are not mutually exclusive, the buyer essentially gets two bites 
at the apple.282 Indeed, a number of federal district courts have held that, 
so long as the shorter prescriptive period for redhibition has not expired, 
the plaintiff may bring an additional claim for breach of warranty of 
fitness.283 In Southwest Louisiana Hospital Association v. BASC 
Construction Chemicals, LLC, for example, a federal district court stated, 
“[C]laims for breach of contract for fitness of ordinary use and for 
redhibition are not mutually exclusive; thus, when a party alleges that a 
product has a redhibitory defect, it may also argue that the redhibitory 
defect rendered the product unfit for its ordinary use.”284 This 
authorization allows a buyer multiple avenues of recovery for the same 
defect and thus creates doubt as to the obligations between the buyer and 
the seller.285 
                                                                                                             
 282. See sources cited infra note 283. 
 283. See, e.g., 425 Notre Dame, LLC v. Kolbe & Kolbe Mill Work Co., Inc., 
No. 15-454, 2016 WL 1110232, at *5 (E.D. La. Mar. 22, 2016); Cassidy v. Ford 
Motor Co., No. 15-2483, 2016 WL 687621, at *4 (E.D. La. Feb. 19, 2016); Sw. 
La. Hosp. Ass’n v. BASC Constr. Chems., LLC, 947 F. Supp. 2d 661, 690 (W.D. 
La. 2013); Justiss Oil Co. v. T3 Energy Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-01745, 2011 WL 
539135, at *5 (W.D. La. Feb. 7, 2011). 
 284. Sw. La. Hosp Ass’n, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 690, 690–92 (“[The] one-year 
prescriptive period on the Hospital’s redhibition claim has not expired, and thus 
the Hospital is free to assert claims under both art. 2520 and art. 2524 in the 
absence of conflicting prescriptive periods.”). In the same opinion, the court 
interpreted Cunard as standing for the proposition that fitness and redhibition are 
“separate and distinct” causes of action that could be present in an action 
collectively or individually. Id. at 700. According to the court, “The crucial 
consideration is what type of issue a buyer has with a product in determining 
whether the warranty of redhibition or the warranty of fitness applies.” Id. By that 
theory, if a product is unfit for ordinary use because of a redhibitory defect, the 
buyer would be limited to a cause of action in redhibition. Id. 
 285. See infra text accompanying notes 286–93. Some courts have tried to 
force different, similarly unsatisfactory distinctions between fitness and 
redhibition. See, e.g., Mire v. Eatelcorp, Inc., 927 So. 2d 1113, 1118 (La. Ct. App. 
2005) (holding that a redhibitory defect is a characteristic or component of the 
thing sold, rather than the entire thing itself, whereas if the thing “is by its nature 
not reasonably fit for its ordinary or intended use,” the rights of the buyer are 
governed by the rules of conventional obligations as opposed to redhibition). 
Other courts have mistakenly conflated the warranties of fitness and redhibition. 
See, e.g., 425 Notre Dame, 2016 WL 1110232, at *4 (“The warranty of fitness is 
closely related to the warranty against redhibitory defects. . . . Because the same 
law applies to both warranties, the Court will discuss them together.”). Still others, 
including the Louisiana Supreme Court, have yet to rule on the issue. 
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Although Professor Litvinoff’s proposed comments could have helped 
clarify the scope of each warranty’s application, they were not 
incorporated into the official comments, thereby intensifying the 
problem.286 Litvinoff’s commentary explained that: (1) the warranty of 
fitness applies in every sale irrespective of whether the thing is defective; 
and (2) the warranty of fitness applies regardless of whether the sale is 
subject to rescission on the grounds of redhibition.287 Under this regime, 
the buyer could seek rescission under redhibition and contractual damages 
under the warranty of fitness.288 On the other hand, when the warranty of 
fitness was proposed to the Law Institute Council, one member of the 
Council noted that the article addressed a thing that is not, in itself, 
defective.289 Under this view, the buyer would only have a cause of action 
for breach of warranty of fitness for a product that was not otherwise 
defective.290 Either approach would have provided a definitive answer.291 
In the law’s current state, however, it remains unclear whether the 
legislature intended to recognize violations of the warranty of fitness in 
situations in which remedies exist under the law of redhibition.292 By 
default, then, the courts have been left to resolve the uncertainty, 
producing results that have been less than satisfactory. Under the current 
state of the law, similarly situated parties remain subject to different 
prescriptive periods, burdens of proof, and remedies depending on 
whether the court decides to treat the warranties of fitness and redhibition 
as mutually exclusive or as concurrent causes of action.293 
                                                                                                             
 286. LA. STATE L. INST., supra note 146, at 7 (prepared for Meeting of the 
Council by Saul Litvinoff, Reporter). Although the proposed comments would have 
clarified confusion as to the overlap between the warranties of fitness and 
redhibition, the comments would not have solved the problem of allowing the buyer 
two shots at recovery. Id. Thus, although the comments would have made the 
relationship between the warranties clearer, the law would still be unfair. Id. 
 287. Id. If these comments had been adopted and made clear that the remedies 
co-exist, buyers would be entitled to recover twice for the same defect under the 
warranty of fitness for ordinary use, which is problematic. The comments would 
clarify the law regarding the warranty of fitness for particular use, which may apply 
to a product that is not defective in itself but not fit for the buyer’s particular use. 
 288. Id. 
 289. LA. STATE L. INST., supra note 161, at 5. 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Bilbe, supra note 20, at 141. 
 293. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2521, 2522, 2530, 2534 (2018); 
see also discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
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B. Fitness for Particular Use: A Meaningful Addition to Louisiana Law 
Whereas adoption of the warranty of fitness for ordinary use was 
unnecessary in light of prior Louisiana jurisprudence,294 the warranty of 
fitness for particular use was an important contribution to Louisiana’s law 
of sales. Unlike the questionable applicability of the warranty of fitness 
for ordinary use,295 it is easy to imagine a situation in which a thing is free 
from redhibitory defects but nonetheless unfit for particular use.296 For 
example, suppose that Betty Buyer from the earlier hypothetical was a 
photographer looking for a printer capable of printing her photographs. If 
the printer does not catch fire, but instead is incapable of printing on photo 
paper, the printer does not suffer from a redhibitory defect—it remains a 
fully functional printer.297 Nonetheless, it is unfit for Betty’s particular 
purpose of printing pictures.298 
In a jurisprudential example, Downs v. Hammett, Downs bought a 
piece of immovable property, intending to subdivide the land into four 
tracts to be used for homes for herself and her children.299 She later 
executed an act of exchange with Hammett Properties, Inc. (“Hammett”), 
in which she exchanged her house and a promissory note for the 3.947-
acre tract of land.300 After the exchange, Downs learned that an ordinance 
restricted the subdivision of her land to tracts consisting of a minimum of 
1.25 acres each, making it impossible for her to subdivide her land in 
accordance with her original plan.301 
On appeal, Downs alleged that Hammett knew of the ordinance that 
made the property unsuitable for her intended use but sold her the property 
anyway and thus defrauded her.302 The court ultimately did not apply the 
warranty of fitness for particular use because Downs did not allege that 
she relied on the skill or judgment of the seller in selecting the tract of 
                                                                                                             
 294. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 295. See Part II.A.1. 
 296. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2524. 
 297. See generally id. Likewise, the printer remains fit for its ordinary use of 
printing. 
 298. Id. As long as Betty could prove that Suzie has knowledge of her 
particular purpose—to print pictures—and that Betty was relying on her expertise 
in selecting the printer, Betty would have a viable claim under the warranty of 
fitness for particular use. Id. art. 2524. 
 299. Downs v. Hammett Properties, Inc., 899 So. 2d 792, 793 (La. Ct. App. 2005). 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. 
 302. Id. at 796. The court noted that “[a]n ordinance that restricts the 
subdivision of property is not a ‘defect’ or ‘vice’ in the ‘thing sold’ within the 
meaning of [article 2520]; it is merely a restriction on the use of the property.” Id. 
320 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
 
 
 
land; however, the court did acknowledge that the law recognizes a cause 
of action against the seller when such reliance exists.303 The warranty of 
fitness for particular use thus carries an independent purpose: providing 
remedies to buyers of non-defective things that do not meet their 
expectations.304 
In contrast to the ambiguous warranty of fitness for ordinary use, the 
warranty of fitness for particular use is readily applicable to sales outside 
the scope of redhibition.305 The Louisiana Civil Code explicitly provides 
two prerequisites that trigger the warranty of fitness for particular use: (1) 
the seller must have reason to know the buyer’s particular use for the thing 
or the buyer’s particular purpose for buying it; and (2) the seller must have 
reason to know that the buyer is relying on his skill or judgment in 
selecting the thing.306 Despite this clear legislative guidance, courts 
struggle to impute meaning into the meaningless warranty of fitness for 
ordinary use,307 which may inhibit the warranty of fitness for particular use 
from development. 
                                                                                                             
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. 
 305. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 306. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2018). Although the Code provides adequate 
guidance for separating the warranties of fitness for particular and ordinary use, 
some courts have conflated the two concepts. See, e.g., 425 Notre Dame, LLC v. 
Kolbe & Kolbe Mill Work Co., Inc., No. 15-454, 2016 WL 1110232, at *4 (E.D. 
La. Mar. 22, 2016) (“The warranty of fitness is closely related to the warranty 
against redhibitory defects. . . . Because the same law applies to both warranties, 
the Court will discuss them together.”); see also Sw. La. Hosp. Ass’n v. BASC 
Constr. Chems., LLC, 947 F. Supp. 2d 690, 701 (W.D. La. 2013) (purporting to 
set forth a distinction between a redhibitory defect and the warranty of fitness for 
ordinary use but was painstakingly confused about the difference in fitness for 
ordinary and particular use). Citing article 2524, the Southwest Louisiana 
Hospital Ass’n court stated, “[I]n contrast, a product is not fit for ordinary use 
‘[w]hen the seller has reason to know the particular use the buyer intends for the 
thing, or the buyer’s particular purpose for buying the thing, and that the buyer is 
relying on the seller’s skill or judgment in selecting it.’” Id. It appears the courts 
that are confusing the two warranties of fitness are reading article 2524 
conjunctively as opposed to disjunctively, thus merging the warranties of fitness 
for ordinary and particular use into a single warranty. 
 307. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
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III. SOLUTION: REPEAL OF THE WARRANTY OF FITNESS  
FOR ORDINARY USE 
The warranty of fitness for ordinary use has no place in Louisiana 
law.308 The warranty has never had any independent meaning prior to or 
since the 1995 revision and has only spurred uncertainty among the 
courts.309 The artificial classification scheme between ordinary fitness and 
redhibition subjects similarly situated parties to different prescriptive 
periods, measures of damages, and remedies for inexecution, which is 
highly undesirable.310 
Even when courts correctly recognize that warranty of fitness and 
redhibition are the same, the law remains problematic because election of 
remedies undermines redhibition.311 A thing that suffers from a redhibitory 
defect will likewise be unfit for ordinary use,312 and in most cases, a breach 
of the warranty of fitness entitles the buyer to seek damages, as well as 
dissolution of the sale, a broader remedy than is provided under 
redhibition.313 Unlike the warranty of redhibition, with its numerous 
requirements and exclusive remedies, Louisiana Civil Code article 2524 is 
short and open-ended.314 Consequently, buyers are incentivized to pursue 
an action under breach of warranty of fitness rather than redhibition when 
both causes of action exist.315 
Thus, the existence of the warranty of fitness for ordinary use as a 
stand-alone warranty detracts from redhibition, which is at the heart of 
Louisiana sales law.316 After decades of development, redhibition strikes 
the proper balance between buyers and sellers by providing specific rules 
exclusive to sales.317 As early as 1966, it was recognized that “[t]he 
historical reason for application of this shorter [redhibitory] prescription 
period . . . is the practical necessity to determine promptly and certainly 
                                                                                                             
 308. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 309. See discussion supra Parts I.B.2 & II.A.1. 
 310. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 311. If warranty of fitness for ordinary use and redhibition mean the same 
thing, the buyer can elect to bring his claim under either cause of action. 
 312. Bilbe, supra note 20, at 140. 
 313. Larissa Teipner, The Damage Carve-Out of the Louisiana Products 
Liability Act: Are Manufacturers Potentially Liable for Warranty of Fitness?, 70 
LA. L. REV. 615, 625 (2010). 
 314. Odinet, supra note 62, at 764. 
 315. Teipner, supra note 313, at 624. See discussion supra Part II.A.2. 
 316. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 317. Odinet, supra note 62, at 767. 
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whether the article sold did or did not have the vices claimed.”318 Because 
redhibition is deeply embedded in the civil law,319 its preservation is vital. 
Accordingly, buyers should not be given the choice between fitness for 
ordinary use and redhibition for the same defect.320 If given the choice, 
buyers will almost always choose to bring their claims under the warranty 
of fitness, which will lead necessarily to the unwelcome demise of 
redhibition.321 
Louisiana could avoid these problems if the law of redhibition 
governed all issues concerning things unfit for ordinary use without 
concern for whether the items are “defective.” Courts should address 
products that are not defective, but otherwise not up to the buyer’s 
particular standards, under the umbrella of general contract law using the 
warranty of fitness for particular use.322 To accomplish this objective, the 
legislature must repeal the warranty of fitness for ordinary use. Repealing 
the warranty of fitness for ordinary use will promote clarity and uniformity 
throughout the law of sales in Louisiana without detracting from the 
substantive law. 
Because the warranty of redhibition already encompasses breach of 
fitness for ordinary use,323 a repeal of ordinary fitness will not undermine 
the substantive law. As Professor Litvinoff recognized, “[A]ll situations 
falling under the U.C.C. warranty of fitness are contemplated by the 
Louisiana Civil Code as instances covered either by the warranty of 
redhibition or as breach of contract.”324 In other words, even when a buyer 
cannot point to a particular physical defect or underlying cause of a 
product’s malfunction, if the product proves to be unfit for use because it 
is defective, the buyer may bring a claim in redhibition.325 Hence, repeal 
will marry the warranties of redhibition and fitness for ordinary use rather 
                                                                                                             
 318. Victory Oil Co. v. Perret, 183 So. 2d 360, 363 (La. Ct. App. 1966). See 
also Justiss Oil Co. v. T3 Energy Servs., Inc., 2011 WL 539135, at *5 (W.D. La. 
2011) (“[Permitting] the plaintiff to proceed on the contractually based warranty 
of fitness with its 10 year prescriptive period would have entirely vitiated the 
protections of Louisiana’s comparatively brief one year prescriptive period under 
the warranty against redhibitory defects.”). 
 319. See discussion supra Part I.B.1. 
 320. See supra text accompanying note 315. 
 321. See discussion supra part I.B.1. 
 322. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2520, 2524 (2018). 
 323. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 324. LA. STATE L. INST., supra note 146, at 7 (prepared for Meeting of the 
Council by Saul Litvinoff, Reporter). 
 325. See, e.g., Rey v. Cuccia, 298 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974). 
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than abolish the concept of fitness for ordinary use.326 The goal of 
consolidating the warranties is to direct Louisiana courts to interpret 
redhibition broadly so as to encompass breaches of fitness for ordinary use 
without concern of importing general contract law to situations that ought 
to remain under redhibition.327 
The warranty of fitness for particular use should remain as an 
independent cause of action for breach of contract.328 This warranty does 
not generate any of the problems that the warranty of fitness for ordinary 
use creates.329 Courts still must distinguish between the existence of a 
redhibitory defect and a breach of the warranty of fitness for particular use, 
but this distinction is intuitive, with relevant articles providing sufficient 
guidelines on each.330 Furthermore, because the legislation provides clear 
guidance as to the scope of the warranty’s application such that it is 
applicable only when the additional elements are met,331 the use of the 
warranty of fitness for ordinary use alleviates the concern of undermining 
redhibition. Additionally, repeal of fitness for ordinary use will let fitness 
for particular use stand alone, making it easier for courts to appreciate that 
it is a separate warranty, distinct from redhibition.332 Indeed, repealing 
ordinary fitness is necessary to give fitness for particular use an opportunity 
to develop.333 
                                                                                                             
 326. See generally discussion supra Parts II.A.1–2. 
 327. See generally discussion supra Parts II.A.1–2. 
 328. See generally LA. CIV. CODE art. 2524 (2018). 
 329. See infra text accompanying note 330. 
 330. To prevail in an action for redhibition, the purchaser must establish the 
following: (1) that the thing sold contains a defect that renders it absolutely useless 
or that diminishes its usefulness so that it must be presumed that a buyer would 
still have bought it but for a lesser price (LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520); (2) that the 
defect existed at the time of delivery; (id. art. 2530); (3) that the defect was neither 
known by him nor apparent (id. art. 2521); and (4) that the seller could not, or 
would not, correct the defects when given the opportunity to do so (id. art. 2522). 
The warranty of fitness, on the other hand, only applies when: (1) the seller has 
reason to know the particular use the buyer intends for the thing or the buyer’s 
particular purpose for buying it; and (2) that the buyer is relying on the seller’s 
skill or judgment in selecting it. Id. art. 2524. 
 331. See generally id. art. 2524. 
 332. See discussion infra note 333. 
 333. The ten-year prescriptive period applicable to warranty of fitness claims 
survives long after a redhibition claim, which expires against a good faith seller 
four years from delivery of the thing or one year from discovery of the defect and 
against a bad faith seller one year from discovery of the defect. See LA. CIV. CODE 
art. 2534. Courts are addressing cases in the context of prescription because 
plaintiffs are filing suit after the one-year redhibitory claim prescribes but before 
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Along with the repeal of ordinary fitness, the legislature must outline 
the interplay of the warranties of redhibition and fitness for particular use 
in a situation in which an item is unfit for a particular purpose only because 
of a redhibitory defect.334 When a thing sold contains a redhibitory defect, 
the law of redhibition should govern.335 Moreover, if a thing suffers from 
a redhibitory defect, the buyer ought to be limited to a cause of action in 
redhibition even when that defect renders the thing unfit for the buyer’s 
particular use, the seller knew of the buyer’s intended use, and that the 
buyer was relying on his skill in selecting the thing.336 In other words, as 
a policy matter, the legislature should provide that the warranties of 
redhibition and fitness for particular use are mutually exclusive causes of 
action.337 Revision comments to that effect are necessary.338 
CONCLUSION  
The contribution of the warranty of fitness for ordinary use to 
Louisiana sales law since its codification in 1995 can be summed up in 
one word: confusion.339 The warranty has no independent meaning in 
Louisiana and has prompted discrepancies among the courts.340 Without 
clarity in the legislation, the courts can never be consistent. Consequently, 
the legislature must repeal the warranty of fitness for ordinary use.341 
Repealing the warranty of fitness for ordinary use will promote clarity and 
uniformity throughout the law of sales in Louisiana without detracting 
                                                                                                             
the warranty of fitness claim prescribes, and defendants are filing exceptions of 
prescription in response. See, e.g., Sw. La. Hosp. Ass’n v. BASC Constr. 
Chemicals, LLC, 947 F. Supp. 2d 661 (W.D. La. 2013); Justiss Oil Co. v. T3 
Energy Servs., Inc., No. 1:07-cv-01745, 2011 WL 539135 (W.D. La. Feb. 7, 
2011); Cunard Line Co. v. Datrex, Inc., 926 So. 2d 109 (La. Ct. App. 2006). 
Courts are therefore forced to determine—often at the peremptory exception 
phase—whether the product contains a defect in order to rule on the exception 
and decide whether the claim will proceed. If this trend continues, the warranty 
of fitness will never develop because courts will continue dismissing cases based 
on the existence of defects rather than the merits of the warranty. 
 334. Bilbe, supra note 20, at 142. As a rule of statutory construction, the 
particular controls over the general, so defective things should remain under the 
realm of redhibition. 
 335. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2520. 
 336. See generally id. 
 337. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 338. See discussion supra Part II.A.1. 
 339. See discussion supra Parts II.A.1–2. 
 340. See discussion supra Parts II.A.1–2. 
 341. See supra Part III. 
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from the substantive law.342 Cases regarding breach of ordinary fitness are 
sufficiently addressed under the warranty of redhibition, and the warranty 
of fitness for particular use sufficiently covers cases of non-defective but 
otherwise non-conforming goods.343 Thus, the repeal will not create a gap 
in the law but, instead, will merge the concepts of redhibition and fitness 
for ordinary use. Indeed, repeal of the warranty of fitness for ordinary use 
is vital for the preservation of redhibition, as well as the development of 
fitness for particular use, both of which will increase overall stability 
throughout Louisiana sales law. 
 
Sara Daniel* 
                                                                                                             
 342. See discussion supra Part III. 
 343. See discussion supra Part III. 
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